Honest Confusion: The Purpose of Compensatory Damages in Tort and Fraudulent Misrepresentation by Lens, Jill Wieber
LENS FINAL 12/1/2010 5:47:02 PM 
 
231 
Honest Confusion: The Purpose of Compensatory 
Damages in Tort and Fraudulent 
Misrepresentation 
Jill Wieber Lens∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Suppose that a plaintiff is injured in a rear-end collision car accident.  
Even though the rear-end collision was not a dramatic accident, the 
plaintiff incurred extensive medical expenses because of a preexisting 
medical condition.  Through a negligence claim, the plaintiff can recover 
compensatory damages based on his medical expenses.  But is it fair that 
the defendant should be liable for all of the damages?  It is not as if he 
rear-ended the plaintiff on purpose.  Maybe the fact that defendant’s 
conduct was not reprehensible should reduce the amount of damages that 
the plaintiff recovers. 
Any first-year torts student knows that the defendant’s argument will 
not succeed.  The defendant’s conduct does not control the amount of the 
plaintiff’s compensatory damages.  The damages are based on the 
plaintiff’s injury because, in tort law, the purpose of compensatory 
damages is to make the plaintiff whole by putting him in the same 
position as if the tort had not occurred.1 
But there are tort claims where the amount of compensatory damages 
is not always based on the plaintiff’s injury.  Suppose that a defendant 
fraudulently misrepresents that a car for sale is brand-new.  The plaintiff 
then offers to purchase the car for $10,000.  Had the car actually been 
new, it would have been worth $15,000, but the car was instead worth 
only $10,000.  As they have for a very long time, the majority of 
jurisdictions would award the plaintiff $5000 in compensatory damages 
based on the plaintiff’s expected benefit of the bargain.2 
                                                     
∗ Assistant Professor, Baylor University School of Law.  The author would like to thank 
Todd Pettys for his valuable comments on earlier drafts of this Article.  
 1. See infra Part II.B. 
 2. See infra Part III.  “Cases raising questions as to the choice between the ‘benefit of the 
bargain’ rule and the ‘out of pocket’ rule have been most common in the situations involving alleged 
misrepresentations as to value, quality, or condition.”  Annotation, “Out of Pocket” or “Benefit of 
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Courts label these damages “compensatory,” but do not treat them 
like compensatory damages.  For instance, even if courts adhere to the 
majority rule, some would award $0 in compensatory damages because 
the defendant did not profit from the sale and the plaintiff has no out-of-
pocket losses.3  Similarly, the majority of courts would award $0 in 
compensatory damages if the defendant was merely negligent in making 
the misrepresentation.4 
Treating benefit-of-the-bargain damages as compensatory has 
skewed the meaning of compensatory in tort law.  If factors other than 
the plaintiff’s injury change the amount of damages, are the damages still 
compensatory?  If so, what does compensatory mean anymore?  More 
importantly, if tort law tolerates undercompensation of parties injured by 
fraudulent misrepresentation, what’s to stop the defendant in a rear-end 
collision from successfully reducing damages based on his conduct? 
Benefit-of-the-bargain damages cannot be compensatory in tort, and 
none of the practical or theoretical justifications for awarding benefit-of-
the-bargain-based compensatory damages for breach of contract apply to 
tort law.  To restore the meaning of compensatory damages in tort law, 
courts must limit compensatory damages for fraudulent 
misrepresentation to the plaintiff’s out-of-pocket losses.  The purpose of 
benefit-of-the-bargain damages is, and always has been, to punish the 
defendant because he committed fraud; these are punitive damages in 
tort. 
Part II of this Article discusses the distinct purposes of compensatory 
damages in contract and tort law.  Part III discusses courts’ adoption of 
benefit-of-the-bargain-based compensatory damages for fraudulent 
misrepresentation.  Part IV explores the difficulty in distinguishing 
contract and tort actions, a difficulty increased due to the similarity in the 
damages awarded.  Part V argues that benefit-of-the-bargain damages are 
not compensatory as contemplated by tort law.  Part VI further argues 
that the reasons and justifications for awarding benefit-of-the-bargain-
based compensatory damages in contract law do not apply to tort law.  
The last Parts of the Article explore the consequences of awarding 
benefit-of-the-bargain-based compensatory damages in tort and conclude 
that benefit-of-the-bargain damages in tort should be awarded only as 
punitive damages. 
                                                                                                                       
the Bargain” as Proper Rule of Damages for Fraudulent Representations Inducing Contract for the 
Transfer of Property, 13 A.L.R. 3d 875, 952 (1967).  This Article focuses on this most common type 
of fraudulent misrepresentation. 
 3. See infra notes 199–203 and accompanying text. 
 4. See infra Part V.B. 
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II. THE PURPOSES OF COMPENSATORY DAMAGES IN CONTRACT 
VERSUS TORT 
A plaintiff can recover compensatory damages in both breach-of-
contract and tort actions.  However, the purposes and measures of those 
compensatory damages differ. 
A. Contract 
In contract law, “[t]he purpose[] of awarding contract damages is to 
compensate the injured party”5 and not to punish the breaching party.6  
The traditional approach to measuring compensatory damages is based 
on fulfilling the nonbreaching party’s interests.7  The purposes relevant 
to this Article are the expectation and reliance interests. 
1. Compensatory Damages Based on the Nonbreaching Party’s 
Expectation Interest 
The goal of the expectation interest is to award the nonbreaching 
party that amount of money “necessary to ensure that the aggrieved 
party’s position after the award will be the same—to the extent money 
can achieve the identity—as if the other party had performed.”8  
Expectation interest damages put the nonbreaching party in the same 
place as if the breach had not occurred.9  These damages give the 
nonbreaching party “relief based on the disappointment in his 
expectation, as measured by the net gain that he would have enjoyed had 
the promise been performed.”10  These damages are typically known as 
                                                     
 5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 cmt. a (1981). 
 6. E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 
1146 (1970).  Liability for breach of contract is “blind to fault” and strict—the breaching party is 
liable regardless of whether the breach was intentional or innocent.  Id. at 1146–47.  Not 
surprisingly, punitive damages are generally not available for breach of contract.  But see infra note 
263 (explaining that punitive damages are available in a tort action even if the conduct that is the 
basis of the tort claim also constitutes a breach of contract). 
 7. Eric G. Andersen, The Restoration Interest and Damages for Breach of Contract, 53 MD. L. 
REV. 1, 9–10 (1994).  Regardless of what type of compensatory damages are available—based on 
either the expectation or the reliance interest—the plaintiff will also be entitled to consequential 
damages, assuming that they were within the parties’ contemplation at the time of entering into the 
contract.  See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES—EQUITY—RESTITUTION § 3.2, at 
289, § 3.4, at 321 (2d ed. 1993). 
 8. David H. Vernon, Expectancy Damages for Breach of Contract: A Primer and Critique, 
1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 179, 183. 
 9. Farnsworth, supra note 6, at 1147–48. 
 10. Id. at 1148. 
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benefit-of-the-bargain damages because they give the nonbreaching party 
the benefit he expected to receive from the contract he made.11  The 
damages give the nonbreaching party something he did not have before 
he made the contract.12 
Benefit-of-the-bargain damages also usually have the effect of 
placing the breaching party in the same position as if he had performed.13  
For instance, requiring the breaching party to pay benefit-of-the-bargain 
damages may mean that the breaching party has to pay damages in the 
amount that he expected to lose in the bargain.14  Thus, in contract law, 
benefit-of-the-bargain damages usually put both parties in the same 
economic position as if both parties performed. 
2. Compensatory Damages Based on the Nonbreaching Party’s 
Reliance Interest 
Damages based on the reliance interest, on the other hand, 
“compensate[] a party for losses or harms that were incurred or suffered 
based on the assumption that the promise of the breaching party would 
be kept.”15  Reliance interest damages put the nonbreaching party in the 
same position as before he entered into the contract,16 as opposed to the 
position as if the contract existed but had been breached. 
Damages based on the reliance interest cannot exceed damages based 
on the expectation interest.17  Because of this, a plaintiff generally does 
not seek reliance damages if expectation damages are available.18  Most 
commonly, a plaintiff seeks reliance damages when he is unable to 
                                                     
 11. Id. 
 12. Commentators have thus characterized expectancy damages as a “queer kind of 
‘compensation,’” but justifiable because the damages encourage people to enter into contracts.  Id. 
(quoting L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 
YALE L.J. 52, 53 (1936)). 
 13. Vernon, supra note 8, at 191.  As discussed by Farnsworth, if “society were seriously 
concerned with the compulsion of promisors, it might at least be expected to impose civil penalties 
for the breach of contract if it chose not to impose criminal ones.”  Farnsworth, supra note 6, at 
1146. 
 14. See Vernon, supra note 8, at 184. 
 15. Andersen, supra note 7, at 9. 
 16. Vernon, supra note 8, at 247 (“In its pure form, the reliance damage test returns the 
aggrieved party to the position occupied prior to having entered the contract.”).  An example of 
reliance-based damages is reimbursement of “expenditures [the plaintiff] made in preparation for 
performance or in performance.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 349 (1981). 
 17. Andersen, supra note 7, at 13 (“Expectation, therefore, may exceed reliance, but not vice 
versa; the expectation interest is a ceiling on reliance damages.”). 
 18. See id. at 14–15 (characterizing expectation interest damages as “more generous” and 
reliance interest damages as “equally or less generous”). 
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demonstrate the amount of expectation damages to a substantial 
certainty, when he expects a loss would have occurred if the contract had 
been performed, or when the court limits recovery to reliance damages.19 
B. Tort 
The types and measures of tort damages are based on the purposes of 
tort law.  Those purposes are “(a) to give compensation, indemnity or 
restitution for harms; (b) to determine rights; (c) to punish wrongdoers 
and deter wrongful conduct; and (d) to vindicate parties and deter 
retaliation or violent and unlawful self-help.”20  Awarded damages must 
carry out one or more of these purposes.21 
Based on its first purpose, tort law provides for recovery of 
compensatory damages.  The aim of compensatory damages is to put the 
injured party “in a position substantially equivalent in a pecuniary way to 
that which he would have occupied had no tort been committed,”22 thus 
making the plaintiff whole.23  Compensatory damages do not include any 
amount “in excess of the damages [the plaintiff] has suffered” because 
the “plaintiff is entitled to be made whole and nothing more.”24  
Compensatory damages in tort thus do not confer a windfall on the 
plaintiff.25 
                                                     
 19. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 349 cmts. a & b. 
 20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979).  Tort law allows recovery of nominal 
damages to fulfill the second purpose of tort law, the determination of rights.  Id. § 901 cmt. b. 
 21. Id. § 901 cmt. a.  Like the damages available for breach of contract, a plaintiff should also 
be able to recover consequential damages in tort.  Id. § 917 (“One who tortiously harms the person 
or property of another is subject to liability for damages for the consequences of the harm in 
accordance with the rules on whether the conduct is a legal cause of the consequences.”). 
 22. Id. § 903 cmt. a. 
 23. E.g., Lovelace Med. Ctr. v. Mendez, 805 P.2d 603, 616 (N.M. 1991) (“The purpose of 
compensatory damages [in tort law] is to make an injured person whole.”); Columbus Fin., Inc. v. 
Howard, 327 N.E.2d 654, 658 (Ohio 1975) (“In a tort action, the measure of damages is normally 
that amount of money which will compensate and make whole the injured party.”); Overstreet v. 
Shoney’s, Inc., 4 S.W.3d 694, 703 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (“The purpose of tort damages in Anglo-
American law is to compensate the wronged party for damage or injury caused by the defendant’s 
conduct.  The goal of awarding damages is to repair the wronged party’s injury, or, at least, to make 
the wronged party whole as nearly as may be done by an award of money.” (citations omitted)); 
Schickling v. Aspinall, 369 S.E.2d 172, 174 (Va. 1988) (explaining that the purpose of 
compensatory damages is to make the plaintiff whole but not more than whole); DeNike v. Mowery, 
418 P.2d 1010, 1019 (Wash. 1966) (explaining that the fundamental purpose of tort law is to make 
the plaintiff “as nearly whole as possible through pecuniary compensation”). 
 24. Brown v. Valley Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 549 P.2d 1056, 1058 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976); see also 
Bondi v. Citigroup, Inc., No. BER-L-10902-04, 2005 WL 1284041, at *8 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Law 
Div. May 31, 2005) (“As a general rule, a party may not . . . be made more than whole by 
compensation that exceeds the actual damages sustained.”). 
 25. See, e.g., Mesirow v. Leiserv, Inc., No. CIV 04-2052 PHX RCB, 2005 WL 6271135, at *4 
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Based on the third and fourth purposes of tort law, punitive damages 
are available in some tort claims.26  The aim of punitive damages is to 
punish and deter the defendant wrongdoer.27  In certain torts, punitive 
damages may be awarded to punish the defendant for his conduct and to 
deter him and others from committing similar conduct in the future.28  
Punitive damages are proper when the defendant’s conduct is outrageous, 
whether because of his “evil motive or his reckless indifference to the 
rights of others.”29 
III. COURTS’ ADOPTION OF THE BENEFIT-OF-THE-BARGAIN MEASURE 
OF DAMAGES FOR FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION 
Today, the most common measure of compensatory damages for the 
tort of fraudulent misrepresentation is benefit-of-the-bargain damages—
the same as expectation interest compensatory damages for breach of 
contract.  In the fraudulent misrepresentation context, the benefit-of-the-
bargain measure of damages allows the plaintiff to recover the difference 
in value of the property as represented by the defendant and the value of 
the property the plaintiff ultimately received.30  Under this measure, the 
plaintiff “will have no loss” and “will achieve any economic gains he 
would have had if the representations had been correct.”31 
A. Majority Rule at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century 
One of the earliest cases in which the court allowed benefit-of-the-
bargain damages for fraud was Stiles v. White, which involved a 
                                                                                                                       
(D. Ariz. Dec. 1, 2005) (explaining that the purpose of compensatory damages in tort does not 
include conferring a windfall on the plaintiff); McAuley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 578 N.W.2d 282, 285 
(Mich. 1998) (“Because the purpose of compensatory damages is to make the injured party whole 
for the losses actually suffered, the amount of recovery for such damages is inherently limited by the 
amount of the loss [and] the party may not make a profit . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 cmt. c. 
 27. Id.  Unlike contract law, tort law encompasses the ideas of punishment and deterrence.  Id. 
 28. Id. § 908(1). 
 29. Id. § 908(2).  Some states control the availability of punitive damages by statute.  See, e.g., 
infra note 232 and accompanying text.  Punitive damages are generally not available for breach of 
contract, but if the plaintiff has the ability to sue for both tort and breach of contract, the “fact that 
[the defendant’s] act or omission amounts to a breach of contract does not preclude the award of 
punitive damages if the action is brought for the tort and the tort is one for which punitive damages 
are proper.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. b. 
 30. Effectively, benefit-of-the-bargain damages make the representation true by awarding an 
amount equivalent to the value of the good as the defendant represented.  See infra notes 131–33 and 
accompanying text. 
 31. 2 DOBBS, supra note 7, § 9.2(1), at 551. 
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misrepresentation regarding the value of a horse.32  The court affirmed 
the trial court’s instruction that the measure of damages was the 
difference between the actual value of the horse and the value of the 
horse as represented by the defendants.33  The court also noted that this is 
the measure of damages for breach of warranty and that the measure of 
damages for fraudulent misrepresentation should be the same: “[S]urely 
the defendants cannot claim a more favorable rule of damages[] on the 
ground of their own fraud.”34  The court “discerned a moral barrier 
against fixing a lesser measure, [because of] the gain to the defrauding 
party which would result from fraud if a lesser measure were adopted for 
fraud.”35 
Over time, the benefit-of-the-bargain measure of damages for 
fraudulent misrepresentation became well-settled Massachusetts law.36  
Massachusetts courts considered the measure as “the only rule which will 
give the purchaser adequate damages for not having the thing which the 
defendant undertook to sell him” and the only way to benefit the 
innocent plaintiff instead of the wrongdoer.37  After 1870, numerous 
other states adopted the benefit-of-the-bargain damages measure for 
fraud claims, and commentators began to advocate the benefit-of-the-
bargain measure.38 
By 1918, the benefit-of-the-bargain measure of damages for 
fraudulent misrepresentation was the majority rule.39  In Hallen v. 
Martin, the South Dakota Supreme Court found that the majority rule 
was “sounder” and was the only measure that puts the plaintiff in the 
same place as if the fraud had not occurred by awarding the plaintiff “his 
actual loss by reason of the fraud of the seller.”40  Further, the court 
agreed that the benefit-of-the-bargain measure of damages was necessary 
to ensure that “‘any advantage lawfully secured to the innocent purchaser 
                                                     
 32. 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 356, 356 (1846). 
 33. Id. at 358. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Gary L. Monserud, Measuring Damages After Buyer’s Affirmation of an Article 2 Sales 
Contract Induced by Fraud: A Study of Code Jurisprudence in Light of Section 2-721 and Pre-code 
Conflicts in Remedial Theory, 1996 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 423, 432. 
 36. See Morse v. Hutchins, 102 Mass. 439, 440 (1869). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Monserud, supra note 35, at 434–35 (discussing that Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
North Dakota, Colorado, Nebraska, and Georgia adopted the benefit-of-the-bargain measure of 
damages for fraudulent misrepresentation). 
 39. See Hallen v. Martin, 167 N.W. 314, 319 (S.D. 1918) (Smith, J., concurring) (noting that 
thirty-four states followed the benefit-of-the-bargain rule in 1918). 
 40. Id. at 315. 
LENS FINAL 12/1/2010  5:47:02 PM 
238 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 
in the original bargain [not] inure to the benefit of the wrongdoer.’”41  
The use of a measure yielding lesser damages would “place a premium 
on fraud and deceit[] because oftentimes the defendant . . . would get out 
much easier by virtue of his fraud and deceit than if he had only been 
guilty of a breach of contractual warranty.”42  The concurring opinion in 
Hallen noted that fraud and breach of warranty causes of action should 
have identical measures of compensatory damages.43 
B. Minority Rule at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century 
Not all jurisdictions embraced the benefit-of-the-bargain measure, 
however, including the federal courts.  This minority of jurisdictions 
instead adopted the out-of-pocket damages measure. 
The English court of appeal first addressed the issue of the damages 
recoverable for fraudulent misrepresentation in Peek v. Derry, where the 
plaintiff was induced to purchase stock as a result of 
misrepresentations.44  The court defined the applicable measure of 
damages as the plaintiff’s out-of-pocket losses, meaning the difference 
between the purchase price and the value of the good received.45  This 
was the amount that the plaintiff was “worse off” due to his purchase of 
the shares, and this was the loss that the plaintiff sustained by acting on 
the misrepresentation.46 
The United States Supreme Court adopted this logic in Smith v. 
Bolles.47  The Court found that that the defendant who misrepresented 
the value of stock was liable for damages that “naturally and proximately 
resulted from the fraud” and thus “was bound to make good the loss 
                                                     
 41. Id. at 316 (quoting Morse, 102 Mass. at 440). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 319 (Smith, J., concurring). 
 44. [1888] 37 Ch.D. 541 at 542 (Eng.). 
 45. Id. at 591.  As explained by Lord Justice Cotton: 
The damage to be recovered by the Plaintiff is the loss which he sustained by acting on 
the representations of the Defendants.  That action was taking the shares.  Before he was 
induced to buy the shares, he had the £4000 in his pocket.  The day when the shares were 
allotted to him, which was the consequence of his action, he paid over that £4000, and he 
got the shares; and the loss sustained by him in consequence of his acting on the 
representations of the Defendants was having the shares, instead of having in his pocket 
the £4000.  The loss, therefore, must be the difference between his £4000 and the then 
value of the shares. 
Id. 
 46. Id. at 594 (“The question is, how much worse off is the Plaintiff than if he had not bought 
the shares?  If he had not bought the shares he would have had his £4000 in his pocket.  To ascertain 
his loss we must deduct from that amount the real value of the thing he got.” (Sir. Hannen)). 
 47. 132 U.S. 125 (1889). 
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sustained.”48  However, “this liability did not include the expected fruits 
of an unrealized speculation” because “[w]hat the plaintiff might have 
gained is not the question, but what he had lost by being deceived into 
the purchase.”49 
The Supreme Court again limited damages for fraudulent 
misrepresentation to out-of-pocket losses in Sigafus v. Porter.50  The 
Court stated that the out-of-pocket-losses measure compensates the 
plaintiff for the amount of “‘money he has parted with without receiving 
an equivalent therefor.’”51  The plaintiff’s “‘actual loss does not include 
the extravagant dreams which prove illusory.’”52  Any such damages 
would be something other than compensatory and thus not available.53 
Following the lead of the Supreme Court, some state courts adopted 
the minority out-of-pocket-losses measure of damages.54  For example, 
the Supreme Court of Minnesota refused to consider the represented 
value of land because “the action was in tort.”55  The court declared that 
the defendant was liable for those damages that “naturally and 
proximately resulted from the fraud,” meaning the out-of-pocket losses 
actually sustained.56 
C. The First Restatement of Torts 
In 1938, the First Restatement of Torts adopted the minority rule 
measure of damages for fraudulent misrepresentation within business 
transactions and allowed compensatory damages based on “the 
difference between the value of the thing bought, sold or exchanged and 
its purchase price or the value of the thing exchanged for it.”57 
                                                     
 48. Id. at 129. 
 49. Id. at 129–30.  The Court further clarified that the question of what the plaintiff might have 
gained was irrelevant because the claim was not for breach of contract.  Id. at 129. 
 50. 179 U.S. 116 (1900). 
 51. Id. at 124 (quoting High v. Berret, 23 A. 1004, 1004 (Pa. 1892)). 
 52. Id. (quoting High, 23 A. at 1004). 
 53. See id. 
 54. See, e.g., George v. Hesse, 93 S.W. 107, 107 (Tex. 1906) (holding that the extent of the 
plaintiff’s loss due to the fraudulent misrepresentation was “the difference between the value of that 
which he has parted with, and the value of that which he has received under the agreement”). 
 55. Reynolds v. Franklin, 46 N.W. 139, 139 (Minn. 1890). 
 56. Id. 
 57. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 549(a) (1938).  This provision also allows recovery of 
consequential damages.  Id. § 549(b).  For a discussion of the conflict between the First 
Restatement’s measure of damages for fraudulent misrepresentation and the majority test used by the 
courts, see generally John Hannigan, The Measure of Damages in Tort for Deceit, 18 B.U. L. REV. 
681 (1938). 
The First Restatement differentiates based on whether the misrepresentation occurs within a 
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The First Restatement prohibited the recovery of benefit-of-the-
bargain damages for fraudulent misrepresentation: “The fact that [a 
party] would have made a profit if the representation had been true does 
not entitle him to recover for his disappointment in not receiving the gain 
which he was led to expect.”58  According to the First Restatement, if the 
party wanted to recover damages based on his expected gain, the party 
was free to waive the fraud claim and instead pursue relief based on a 
breach-of-warranty theory.59 
The First Restatement acknowledged that “the remedy for deceit and 
the remedy for breach of warranty have been procedurally closely 
interwoven” and that “the liabilities for fraudulent misstatements and 
intentional nondisclosure have been assimilated to the liability for breach 
of warranty.”60  The necessary response to this assimilation, according to 
the First Restatement, was to limit damages for fraudulent 
misrepresentation “to the loss sustained.”61 
D. The Second Restatement of Torts 
Perhaps motivated by the popularity of the benefit-of-the-bargain 
measure of damages, the authors of the Second Restatement of Torts, 
published in 1977, did an about-face.62  Instead of limiting damages due 
                                                                                                                       
business transaction.  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS div. 4, ch. 22, scope note.  A “business 
transaction” is “any action which affects the plaintiff’s financial or economic interests,” including 
“not only the making of a contract, but also any action done in its performance.”  Id.  The rules 
applying to representations within business transactions should differ from those applying in 
nonbusiness transactions because “the ethics of bargaining” affect the rules.  Id.  Courts’ tendency 
“has been to relax the requirement of vigilance against deception but there is no tendency to require 
commercial or financial adversaries to lay all their cards on the table face upward when dealing with 
one another.”  Id. 
 58. Id. § 549 cmt. b. 
 59. Id.  The comments to section 549 also make clear that a party should pursue relief on a 
breach-of-warranty theory to recover benefit-of-the-bargain damages: 
If the fraudulent misrepresentation is so made as to constitute a warranty, the person 
acting in reliance upon it may waive the fraud and bring an action on the warranty in 
which case the measure of damages is that appropriate to an action on the warranty, 
namely, the difference between the value of the article as it is and the value which it 
would have had had the fact warranted been true. 
Id. § 549 cmt. g.  It is not clear why the party could not pursue both fraud and breach-of-warranty 
theories, especially in light of the ability to plead in the alternative.  Ultimately, however, the 
damages awards would merge, assuming that damages due to the fraud and the breach were the 
same.  See infra note 216. 
 60. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS div. 4, ch. 22, scope note. 
 61. See id. 
 62. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549 cmt. g (1977) (“The frequency of these 
situations [where out-of-pocket losses are supposedly insufficient] has led the great majority of the 
American courts to adopt a broad general rule giving the plaintiff, in an action of deceit, the benefit 
of his bargain with the defendant in all cases, and making that the normal measure of recovery in 
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to the increasingly interwoven nature of fraudulent misrepresentation and 
breach-of-warranty claims, the Second Restatement embraces that 
interwoven nature and added the possibility of recovering benefit-of-the-
bargain damages for fraudulent misrepresentation.  Specifically, the 
drafters added subsection 2 to section 549, which states: “The recipient 
of a fraudulent misrepresentation in a business transaction is also entitled 
to recover additional damages sufficient to give him the benefit of his 
contract with the maker, if these damages are proved with reasonable 
certainty.”63 
The commentary clarifies that the out-of-pocket-losses measure of 
damages is “the rule[] normally applicable to determine the measure of 
damages for a fraudulent misrepresentation.”64  The out-of-pocket-losses 
measure of damages is also the “logical rule[] for a tort action, since the 
purpose of a tort action is to compensate for loss sustained and to restore 
the plaintiff to his former position, and not to give him the benefit of any 
contract he has made with the defendant.”65 
According to the Second Restatement, however, out-of-pocket losses 
may not always provide just and satisfactory compensation.66  For 
instance, if the purchase price equals the value of the property plaintiff 
received, the plaintiff has no out-of-pocket losses even though the 
defendant promised that the good was worth more than the purchase 
price.67  In this instance, the plaintiff has no damages and “the defrauding 
party would escape all liability.”68 
                                                                                                                       
actions of deceit.”). 
 63. Id. § 549(2). 
 64. Id. § 549 cmt. g. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id.  The Second Restatement claims that it does not go so far as to adopt the benefit-of-the-
bargain measure of damages for all cases.  See id. § 549 cmt. h.  The commentary’s claim that the 
rule is flexible is curious because the provision appears to guarantee the possibility of benefit-of-the-
bargain damages.  See id. § 549(2) (“The recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation in a business 
transaction is also entitled to recover [benefit-of-the-bargain damages], if these damages are proved 
with reasonable certainty.” (emphasis added)). 
 67. Id. § 549 cmt. g.  The Second Restatement provides another example of the insufficiency of 
out-of-pocket losses when the good the plaintiff receives is useless to the plaintiff even though it is 
worth the purchase price—if the plaintiff “is left with something on his hands that he does not want 
and cannot use.”  Id. § 549 cmt. j.  To end up where he originally planned, the plaintiff will need to 
sell the good he received without incurring a loss and then still seek the good he originally wanted.  
Id.  The purported need for benefit-of-the-bargain damages does not seem compelling, however.  
Damages based on the delay and costs incurred in obtaining the originally desired good should be 
recoverable as consequential damages.  The plaintiff may not be able to purchase the good he 
originally desired at the same price as the deal made with the defendant.  But even then, the plaintiff 
should be able to recover the difference in the agreed-to price and the ultimate price paid for the 
substitute good. 
 68. Id. § 549 cmt. g.  The fear of the defrauding party escaping liability assumes that the 
plaintiff does not pursue relief under a breach-of-contract theory, through which the plaintiff could 
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This result “is not justice between the parties.”69  To achieve justice, 
the Second Restatement allows for the recovery of benefit-of-the-bargain 
damages for fraudulent misrepresentation.70  “The admonitory function 
of the law requires that the defendant not escape liability and justifies 
allowing the plaintiff the benefit of his bargain.”71  Thus, the Second 
Restatement provides for an award of benefit-of-the-bargain damages to 
admonish the defendant. 
E. Current Availability of Benefit-of-the-Bargain Damages for 
Fraudulent Misrepresentation 
Just as in the beginning of the twentieth century and consistent with 
the Second Restatement, the vast majority of states allow the plaintiff to 
recover benefit-of-the-bargain-based compensatory damages for 
fraudulent misrepresentation.72  The second most popular measure is a 
flexible approach, applying either benefit-of-the-bargain or out-of-pocket 
damages depending on which measure is fair and equitable.73  This 
compromise position still allows recovery of benefit-of-the-bargain 
damages for fraudulent misrepresentation.74  Thus, at least eighty percent 
                                                                                                                       
recover both benefit-of-the-bargain-based compensatory damages and nominal damages.  The 
purpose of nominal damages is to recognize that a wrong occurred even though the plaintiff lacks 
actual damages.  Nominal damages are not recoverable for fraudulent misrepresentation because the 
tort requires the plaintiff to have suffered actual damages.  See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 110, at 765 (5th ed. 1984).  The idea that the defendant 
escapes liability if the plaintiff lacks actual damages is flawed because it presumes liability.  To the 
contrary, liability is not possible if the plaintiff lacks actual damages.  Instead of the defendant 
escaping liability if the plaintiff lacks actual damages, the defendant is simply not liable because the 
plaintiff cannot establish one of the elements of the fraudulent misrepresentation claim. 
 69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549 cmt. i. 
 70. The Restatement also clarifies that the plaintiff may not always be entitled to “the value of 
the thing as represented.”  Id. § 549 cmt. l.  The type of damages recoverable will depend on the type 
of bargain.  Id.  If the defendant promised to convey a specifically described good, “the plaintiff is 
entitled to an amount sufficient to give him the value of property of that description.”  Id.  If the 
defendant promised to convey accurate information regarding the good, the plaintiff “is entitled to a 
sufficient amount to place him in the position he would have occupied if he had had the 
information.”  Id. 
 71. Id. § 549 cmt. i.  For a discussion of whether the fear of the defendant escaping liability is 
flawed, see infra note 119. 
 72. See Lawrence v. Forthun, No. A09-543, 2009 WL 4796754, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 
2009) (mentioning that the majority rule for compensatory damages for fraudulent 
misrepresentations is the benefit-of-the-bargain measure); Lightning Litho, Inc. v. Danka Indus., 
Inc., 776 N.E.2d 1238, 1241–42 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (same); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 549 reporter’s note 3 (counting thirty-two states following the benefit-of-the-bargain 
approach). 
 73. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549 reporter’s note 1 (counting eight states 
following the compromise approach). 
 74. Annotation, supra note 2, at 927–28 (discussing that some jurisdictions will apply either the 
out-of-pocket losses or the benefit-of-the-bargain measures of damages, depending on which 
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of states allow the recovery of benefit-of-the-bargain-based 
compensatory damages for fraudulent misrepresentation. 
A small minority of states agrees with the First Restatement of Torts 
and prohibits benefit-of-the-bargain damages for fraudulent 
misrepresentation.75  In these states, the plaintiffs can recover only their 
out-of-pocket losses for fraudulent misrepresentation. 
F. Rejection of Benefit-of-the-Bargain Damages for Negligent 
Misrepresentation 
Despite the widespread acceptance of awarding benefit-of-the-
bargain damages for fraudulent misrepresentation, both the majority of 
courts and the Second Restatement of Torts agree that benefit-of-the-
bargain damages are not available in a claim for negligent 
misrepresentation.76  Per the Second Restatement, this rejection is 
consistent with the “general rule [of] no liability for merely negligent 
conduct that interferes with or frustrates a contract interest or an 
expectancy of pecuniary advantage.”77 
IV. WHAT’S THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONTRACT AND TORT AGAIN? 
The majority of states allow the exact same measure of 
compensatory damages for both breach-of-contract and fraudulent 
misrepresentation actions.78  The similarity in damages available is but 
                                                                                                                       
measure will achieve the “fair and equitable result”). 
 75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549 reporter’s note 2 (counting six states following 
the out-of-pocket approach).  Plaintiffs may also recover consequential damages for fraudulent 
misrepresentation regardless of whether the jurisdiction awards benefit-of-the-bargain or out-of-
pocket-losses damages.  Consequential damages include “pecuniary loss suffered . . . as a 
consequence of the recipient’s reliance upon the misrepresentation.”  Id. § 549(1)(b).  Generally, 
these damages are available for both breach-of-contract and tort actions, although the damages may 
be more difficult to recover for breach of contract because the parties must contemplate the damages 
at the time the contract was made.  See WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER, SELECTED TOPICS ON THE LAW 
OF TORTS 425–26 (1954).  This Article does not take issue with the ability of a plaintiff to recover 
consequential damages for fraudulent misrepresentation; the availability of consequential damages is 
assumed and not discussed. 
 76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552B(2); see also BDO Seidman, LLP v. Mindis 
Acquisition Corp., 578 S.E.2d 400, 401 (2003) (explaining that a majority of jurisdictions follow the 
Second Restatement of Torts and limit damages for negligent misrepresentation to out-of-pocket 
losses because it is “commensurate with the culpability of the [defendant]”). 
 77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552B cmt. b. 
 78. Benefit-of-the-bargain damages for fraudulent misrepresentation are “exactly like the 
expectancy measure of contract damages.”  2 DOBBS, supra note 7, § 9.2(1), at 551.  If state law 
restricts the recovery of damages for fraudulent misrepresentation to out-of-pocket losses, “the 
plaintiff will be better off to recover for contract or warranty breach than for deliberate fraud.”  Id.  
§ 9.2(1), at 549. 
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one of the factors creating confusion between contract and tort actions.79  
A plaintiff would be foolish to not plead both causes of action, leaving 
the court to determine if only the breach-of-contract or tort action is 
proper.  Courts have developed numerous analyses to aid in this 
determination. 
A. Focus on the Source of the Alleged Duty Owed 
Numerous courts focus on the source of the alleged duty owed by the 
defendant.  If the duty is based in the contract itself, then the claim is for 
a breach of contract.80  But if the duty is based on something outside of 
the contract, the duty is based in tort law and the claim is for a tort.81  To 
determine if the duty is based in the contract, the court need not look any 
further than the contract itself.  The duties that result from the contract 
are those “‘imposed by mutual consensus agreements between particular 
individuals.’”82  Thus, contract law is individualistic—the parties define 
the duties owed. 
The source of duties owed in tort law is less definite.  To determine 
if the duty is based in tort, the court must look to whether the law 
imposes a duty as a result of social policy: 
 Tort obligations are in general obligations that are imposed by 
law . . . to avoid injury to others.  By injury here is meant simply the 
interference with the individual’s interest . . . . The variety of interests 
that are protected through tort law in one way or another are divisible 
into three general categories: (1) interests of personality; (2) interests in 
                                                     
 79. For a discussion on the confusion between contract and tort, see PROSSER, supra note 75, at 
386.  In his book, The Death of Contract, Professor Grant Gilmore argued that the distinction 
between contract and tort law is not merely confused but instead nonexistent.  See generally GRANT 
GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974) (arguing that contract law is dissolving into tort law).  
As evidence of the dissolution of contract law into tort law, Gilmore pointed to the similarity in the 
recoverable damages of both.  See id. at 88 (“We may take the fact that damages in contract have 
become indistinguishable from damages in tort as obscurely reflecting an instinctive, almost 
unconscious realization that the two fields, which had been artificially set apart, are gradually 
merging and becoming one.”). 
 80. See, e.g., Wages v. Young, 261 S.W.3d 711, 715 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008). 
 81. See, e.g., id.  Texas courts define the distinction between the duties owed as follows: 
If the defendant’s conduct—such as negligently burning down a house—would give rise 
to liability independent of the fact that a contract exists between the parties, the plaintiff’s 
claim may also sound in tort.  Conversely, if the defendant’s conduct—such as failing to 
publish an advertisement—would give rise to liability only because it breaches the 
parties’ agreement, the plaintiff’s claim ordinarily sounds only in contract. 
Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. DeLanney, 809 S.W.2d 493, 494 (Tex. 1991). 
 82. Chemtech Int’l, Inc. v. Chem. Injection Techs., Inc., No. 05-2296, 2006 WL 690837, at *3 
(3d Cir. Mar. 20, 2006) (quoting Sullivan v. Chartwell Inv. Partners, 873 A.2d 710, 719 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2005)). 
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tangible things, real and personal; and (3) a large body of intangible 
interests, both economic and relational.83 
Whether a duty exists in tort generally depends on (1) the nature of the 
defendant’s activity, (2) the relationship between the plaintiff and the 
defendant, and (3) the type of injury or harm threatened.84 
The focus on the source of the duty distinction has little utility in the 
context of fraudulent misrepresentation.  Technically, the plaintiff need 
not establish the existence of a duty in a fraudulent misrepresentation 
claim.85  This is because the duty of honesty is implicit within the 
transaction.86  Courts have, however, sometimes refused to allow 
fraudulent misrepresentation claims when a contractual duty exists.87 
B. Focus on the Type of Loss 
In addition to the question of the source of the duty, some courts 
look to the nature of the claimed damages to determine whether a claim 
is for breach of contract or tort.  “[T]ort law affords a remedy for losses 
occasioned by personal injuries or damage to one’s property, but contract 
law . . . offer[s] the appropriate remedy for economic losses occasioned 
by diminished commercial expectations not coupled with injury to 
                                                     
 83. KEETON ET AL., supra note 68, at 655; see also Bash v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 601 A.2d 825, 
829 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (explaining that tort duties are “imposed by law as a matter of social 
policy”), superseded by rule on other grounds, PA. R. APP. P. § 314, as recognized in Lombardi v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., No. 08-949, 2009 WL 1811540, at *10 (W.D. Pa. June 23, 2009). 
 84. KEETON ET AL., supra note 68, § 92, at 655. 
 85. Specifically, unlike in a claim for negligent misrepresentation, the plaintiff need not 
establish that the defendant owed a duty of care within a fraudulent misrepresentation claim.  Even 
within negligent misrepresentation, however, the duty of care is presumed if the defendant had a 
pecuniary interest in supplying the information at issue to the plaintiff.  See infra note 121. 
 86. As the Second Restatement explains: 
Honesty requires only that the maker of a representation speak in good faith and without 
consciousness of a lack of any basis for belief in the truth or accuracy of what he says.  
The standard of honesty is unequivocal and ascertainable without regard to the character 
of the transaction in which the information will ultimately be relied upon or the situation 
of the party relying upon it.  Any user of commercial information may reasonably expect 
the observance of this standard by a supplier of information to whom his use is 
reasonably foreseeable. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. a (1977) (emphasis added). 
 87. See Pandjiris, Inc. v. Sunshine Stainless Tank & Equip. Co., 655 F. Supp. 473, 474 (E.D. 
Mo. 1987) (rejecting fraudulent misrepresentation counterclaim because it was “[nothing] more than 
a recasting of its claim for breach of contract as a tort”).  This result in Pandjiris appears inconsistent 
with the Second Restatement.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 530 cmt. c (explaining that 
if the underlying contract is enforceable, “the person misled by the representation has a cause of 
action in tort as an alternative at least, and perhaps in some instances in addition to his cause of 
action on the contract”). 
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person or property.”88  At the same time, specific to fraudulent 
misrepresentations, tort law traditionally governs losses suffered due to 
reliance on representations.89 
Usually reaching the same result, some courts prefer to look at the 
cause of the claimed damages: “When the only loss or damages is to the 
subject matter of the contract, the plaintiff’s action is ordinarily on the 
contract.”90  Claimed benefit-of-the-bargain damages would likely relate 
to the subject matter of the contract and thus not be available in tort.91  If 
applied strictly, this analysis would effectively end the ability to recover 
benefit-of-the-bargain damages for fraudulent misrepresentation.92  To 
recover benefit-of-the-bargain damages, the plaintiff would have no 
choice but to sue for breach of contract. 
C. The Economic-Loss Doctrine 
The economic-loss doctrine, a judicial creation, attempts to 
distinguish between contract and tort actions by limiting the recovery of 
economic losses to breach-of-contract actions.93  Economic losses can 
include both out-of-pocket losses and benefit-of-the-bargain damages.94  
Per the economic-loss doctrine, the plaintiff cannot recover economic 
losses in tort, meaning a plaintiff can bring a claim for economic losses 
only if the plaintiff had contractual privity with the defendant.95 
The economic-loss doctrine “defines the boundary between the 
overlapping theories of tort law and contract law by barring the recovery 
of purely economic losses in tort, particularly in strict liability and 
                                                     
 88. Mars, Inc. v. Heritage Builders of Effingham, Inc., 763 N.E.2d 428, 434 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2002); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 68, § 92, at 657 (“Recovery of intangible economic 
losses is normally determined by contract law.”). 
 89. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 68, § 92, at 658. 
 90. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. DeLanney, 809 S.W.2d 493, 494 (Tex. 1991); see also Jim Walter 
Homes, Inc. v. Reed, 711 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex. 1986) (“When the injury is only the economic loss 
to the subject of a contract itself, the action sounds in contract alone.”). 
 91. See Mars, Inc., 763 N.E.2d at 434 (“A buyer’s desire to enjoy the benefit of his bargain is 
not an interest that tort law traditionally protects.”). 
 92. See Charles Miller, Contortions over Contorts: A Distinct Damages Requirement?, 28 TEX. 
TECH L. REV. 1257, 1276–77 (1997) (arguing that a distinct damages requirement would effectively 
preclude any fraud action involving a contract). 
 93. See, e.g., Bernot v. Primus Corp., 663 N.E.2d 464, 467 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (“Under the 
Moorman doctrine, recovery for economic loss—the loss of the benefit of one’s bargain—ordinarily 
is available only in contract and not in tort.”). 
 94. R. Joseph Barton, Note, Drowning in a Sea of Contract: Application of the Economic Loss 
Rule to Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1789, 1793–94 
(2000). 
 95. See Bernot, 663 N.E.2d at 467 (“With exceptions not pleaded or applicable here, a viable 
action for economic loss requires the plaintiff to be in contractual privity with [the defendant].”). 
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negligence cases.”96  Similarly, the economic-loss doctrine defines a 
distinction between the types of damages recoverable in tort and in 
contract.97  By defining that distinction, the economic-loss doctrine 
“prevent[s] the law of contract and the law of tort from dissolving one 
into the other.”98 
Problematically, “blind application of the [economic-loss] 
doctrine . . . would eviscerate fraud and negligent misrepresentation 
claims.”99  Due to this conflict, courts have had trouble resolving whether 
the economic-loss rule should apply to fraudulent misrepresentation 
claims.  Courts have crafted three approaches: adopting an exception to 
the economic-loss doctrine for fraudulent misrepresentation claims,100 
allowing fraudulent misrepresentation claims to proceed only if the 
alleged fraud is not also related to the contract,101 and applying the 
doctrine to preclude fraudulent misrepresentation claims.102 
                                                     
 96. Barton, supra note 94, at 1789.  The reasoning behind the economic loss doctrine is that 
“tort law is not intended to compensate parties for monetary losses suffered as a result of duties 
which are owed to them simply as a result of the contract.”  Tyler v. Gibbons, 857 N.E.2d 885, 888 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2006). 
 97. The economic-loss rule is inconsistent with traditional thought that losses, including 
economic losses, suffered due to reliance on representations should be recoverable and controlled by 
tort law.  See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 98. Rich Prods. Corp. v. Kemutec, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 937, 969 (E.D. Wis. 1999). 
 99. Barton, supra note 94, at 1824. 
 100. See id. at 1831 (explaining that most states recognize an exception to the economic-loss 
rule for fraud). 
 101. See id. at 1806–11. 
 102. See id. at 1811–12; see also Orlando v. Novurania of Am., Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 220, 225–
26 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (dismissing fraudulent misrepresentation claim based on New York’s economic-
loss doctrine where the only damages sought for the fraudulent misrepresentation were based on the 
benefit of the bargain).  Courts experience the same trouble resolving whether the economic-loss 
doctrine should apply to negligent misrepresentation claims.  Courts have crafted four main 
approaches: adopting an exception to the economic-loss doctrine for negligent misrepresentation 
claims, allowing the claim to proceed only if the defendant is in the business of supplying 
information, allowing the claim to proceed only if the plaintiff is not in contractual privity with the 
defendant, and applying the doctrine to preclude the negligent misrepresentation claim.  Barton, 
supra note 94, at 1814–23.  Illinois courts developed the second approach, allowing the claim to 
proceed only against those defendants in the business of supplying information.  See Tyler v. 
Gibbons, 857 N.E.2d 885, 888–89 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).  In Tyler, the defendants were the board of 
directors of a company that provided products to agricultural producers.  Id.  The plaintiffs were thus 
unable to proceed on a claim of negligent misrepresentation because the defendants were not in the 
business of providing financial information.  Id.  If all states interpreted the negligent 
misrepresentation claim so narrowly, the economic-loss doctrine would likely maintain a distinction 
in the damages available for contract and negligence.  Neither the Restatement nor states other than 
Illinois, however, have adopted such a narrow interpretation.  See Barton, supra note 94, at 1819–22.  
The third approach, allowing the claim to proceed only if the parties are not in contractual privity, 
maintains the distinction between tort and contract because the negligent misrepresentation tort will 
be available only when the contract claim is not.  This limited application is not consistent, however, 
with the idea that economic losses should be recovered in contract claims only.  Moreover, the 
problem with allowing the negligent misrepresentation claim to proceed when no contract exists is 
 
LENS FINAL 12/1/2010  5:47:02 PM 
248 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 
V. TIME TO BE HONEST: BENEFIT-OF-THE-BARGAIN DAMAGES IN TORT 
ARE SOMETHING MORE THAN COMPENSATORY 
Benefit-of-the-bargain damages put the plaintiff in a better position 
than he was in before the tort, rendering these damages something other 
than compensatory.  The unavailability of benefit-of-the-bargain 
damages for negligent misrepresentation further evidences the 
inappropriateness of classifying the damages as compensatory. 
A. Benefit-of-the-Bargain Damages Make the Plaintiff More than 
Whole by Conferring a Windfall 
In tort law, compensatory damages look back to the plaintiff’s 
position before the misrepresentation and give the plaintiff an amount 
that will put him in that same position.103  Borrowing from the facts of 
Peek, suppose that the defendant misrepresents the value of stock.104  The 
plaintiff desires to purchase stock as a result.  The plaintiff has $500 in 
his pocket before he purchases the stock, which he uses to purchase the 
stock from the defendant, but the stock is worth only $400.  Before the 
misrepresentation, the plaintiff has $500, but after the transaction, the 
plaintiff has stock worth only $400.  Compensatory damages should total 
$100, the amount necessary to put the plaintiff in the same place that he 
was in before the misrepresentation when he had $500 in his pocket. 
Benefit-of-the-bargain damages, however, give the plaintiff more.  
Again borrowing from Peek, suppose that the defendant represented the 
stock to be worth $700.  The plaintiff had $500 before the transaction 
and still has stock worth $400 after the transaction.  Benefit-of-the-
bargain damages, however, would give the plaintiff $300.105 
Had there been no deceit, the plaintiff would not have the $200.  
Similarly, had there been no deceit, the plaintiff would not have expected 
to make a $200 profit.106  In fact, had there been no deceit, the plaintiff 
                                                                                                                       
that the plaintiff may be able to avoid rules like the statute of frauds.  See PROSSER, supra note 75, at 
422–29 (explaining the important consequences in choosing to proceed with a contract or tort claim, 
including that the tort claim is not subject to the statute of frauds). 
 103. See supra notes 22–25 and accompanying text. 
 104. Peek v. Derry, [1888] 37 Ch.D. 541 (Eng.).  See generally supra notes 44–46 and 
accompanying text. 
 105. See Chavarria v. Fleetwood Retail Corp. of N.M., 115 P.3d 799, 807 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005) 
(explaining that courts award benefit-of-the-bargain damages for fraud even if the actual loss 
suffered might have been much less), rev’d in part, 143 P.3d 717 (N.M. 2006). 
 106. This illustrates the difference between the ending positions of compensatory damages in 
tort and breach of contract.  In tort, the plaintiff has no expectation before the misrepresentation 
occurs and tort-based compensatory damages thus should not consider the lost expectation.  
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would have $500 in his pocket, not contemplating—much less 
expecting—to make a profit by purchasing stock from the defendant. 
Benefit-of-the-bargain damages, however, mean that the plaintiff 
now has $700—the value of the stock ($400) and the damages ($300)—
even though the plaintiff had only $500 before the misrepresentation.  No 
one can disagree that the benefit-of-the-bargain damages thus put the 
plaintiff “in better shape financially than he would have been in if there 
had been no deceit.”107  Similarly, no one can disagree that this plaintiff 
received a financial windfall—basically a gift of $200.  By definition, 
however, compensatory damages do not confer a windfall.108 
This hypothetical is just one example of the many cases where 
benefit-of-the-bargain damages make the plaintiff better off than before 
the tort.  In Leftwich v. Gaines, the plaintiff wanted to purchase property 
to expand her business.109  She made an offer to purchase it for $10,000 
but heard nothing from the seller.110  After the offer, a municipality 
official misrepresented to the plaintiff that the property may not be able 
to be rezoned and that her offer was too high.111  The seller ultimately 
accepted a bid from someone associated with the same municipality 
official.112  At trial, the plaintiff sought damages for the fraudulent 
misrepresentation based on her disappointed expectations; she testified 
that she would have had property worth $120,000 had she been able to 
purchase the property she desired.113 
Before the alleged misrepresentation, the plaintiff owned property 
worth $50,000.114  After the misrepresentation, she still owned property 
worth $50,000.115  The plaintiff was still in the same position both before 
and after the misrepresentation.  Despite her lack of out-of-pocket losses, 
the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed a compensatory damage 
award of $60,000 based on the “loss of the property value” to the 
                                                                                                                       
Expectation-interest damages in contract, however, put the plaintiff in the same position as if the 
contract had not been breached.  See supra Part II.A.1.  The plaintiff’s expectation exists before the 
breach, and contract law compensates for that lost expectation. 
To avoid the problem caused by the rule that tort damages look to the position the plaintiff was 
in before the tort, advocates of benefit-of-the-bargain damages claim that the falsity of the 
misrepresentation constitutes the tort instead of the misrepresentation itself.  See infra note 132 and 
accompanying text.  For an argument discrediting this conceptual separation, see infra notes 132–33. 
 107. Hallen v. Martin, 167 N.W. 314, 321 (S.D. 1918) (Whiting & Gates, JJ., dissenting). 
 108. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 109. 521 S.E.2d 717, 721 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 721–22. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 725. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See id. 
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plaintiff.116  The court’s characterization of the plaintiff’s damages as a 
“loss” is remarkable because the plaintiff never owned nor had any 
contractual claim to the adjoining property,117 but the damages gave her 
the value of that adjoining property.118 
How could the plaintiff be entitled to compensatory damages based 
on the loss of something that she never had?  That is exactly what 
benefit-of-the-bargain damages do—give plaintiffs something they did 
not have before the misrepresentation.  By definition then, benefit-of-the-
bargain damages cannot be compensatory in tort because they put 
plaintiffs in a better position than before the misrepresentation and, 
similarly, confer a financial windfall. 
B. If Benefit-of-the-Bargain Damages Were Truly Compensatory, They 
Would Be Available for Negligent Misrepresentation 
According to the Second Restatement, benefit-of-the-bargain 
damages are necessary for fraudulent misrepresentation, “to make the 
deception of a deliberate defrauder unprofitable to him.”119  This same 
                                                     
 116. Id. at 722, 725. 
 117. The plaintiff had simply made an offer to purchase the property; the seller was obviously 
under no obligation to sell to the plaintiff.  It also does not appear that any enforceable contract 
existed, as the seller had not accepted the plaintiff’s offer to purchase and no written contract 
existed.  See id. at 721–22. 
Because the plaintiff had no claim against the seller, the plaintiff sued the third party who 
ultimately purchased the property, seeking damages based on the profit the plaintiff hoped to make.  
See id. at 721–22, 725.  The most logical argument supporting this theory of recovery would be that 
the plaintiff was dissuaded from making a second offer on the property.  Assuming the plaintiff 
could prove that the seller would have accepted the offer, the plaintiff could recover consequential 
damages based on the lost opportunity to purchase the property.  To be eligible for these damages, 
the plaintiff would need to show the existence of the opportunity to a reasonable certainty.  KEETON 
ET AL., supra note 68, § 110, at 767 (“Consequential damages must be established with reasonable 
certainty, and must not be speculative or contingent . . . .”); see also Leftwich, 521 S.E.2d at 724.  
But the facts of the case do not support this lost-opportunity theory.  The plaintiff had no incentive to 
make a second offer because the seller had not responded, and the appellate court characterized the 
damages as “loss of the property value” as opposed to loss of the opportunity to purchase property.  
See Leftwich, 521 S.E.2d at 725. 
 118. Leftwich, 521 S.E.2d at 725. 
 119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552B cmt. b (1977).  The proper remedy to deprive 
the defendant of any profits, however, is restitution.  See KEETON ET AL., supra note 68, § 110, at 
765–66 (“Since the purpose [of restitution] is not to compensate the plaintiff’s loss, but to restore 
what the defendant has received, the courts look to the inequity of allowing him to retain it, rather 
than to the damage which the plaintiff has sustained.”).  Regardless, the concern that benefit-of-the-
bargain damages are necessary to ensure that the defendant does not retain any profit makes little 
sense because out-of-pocket-losses damages would require the defendant to return the profit made in 
most cases.  By definition, out-of-pocket losses are the difference between what the plaintiff paid 
and what the plaintiff received, which is also the same as the defendant’s profit—the difference 
between what the defendant sold and received in exchange.  See supra note 45 and accompanying 
text. 
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sentiment does not apply to negligent misrepresentation, however, where 
“the defendant has had honest intentions but has merely failed to exercise 
reasonable care in what he says or does.”120  Thus, in negligent 
misrepresentation, “the fault of the maker of the misrepresentation is 
sufficiently less,” and benefit-of-the-bargain damages are not 
available.121  If benefit-of-the-bargain damages were actually 
compensatory, however, they would be available for negligent 
misrepresentation.  The idea that the amount of compensatory damages 
depends on the defendant’s intentions in making the misrepresentation is 
an anomaly in tort law. 
1. From the Injured Party’s Perspective, the Damages Caused by 
Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Negligent Misrepresentation Do 
Not Differ 
Suppose that the defendant represents that a good is worth $500, 
exciting the plaintiff when he agrees to purchase it for $250.  In reality, 
the good has a fair market value at the time of the transaction of only 
$200.  After the purchase, the plaintiff has a tangible loss of $50—the 
difference between the $250 the plaintiff paid and the value of the good 
the plaintiff received.  The plaintiff is also left with disappointed 
expectations.  He thought that he was making a profit of $250 but ended 
up with a loss of $50.  The plaintiff’s expectation-based damages are 
$300. 
Per the majority rule, if the representation was fraudulent, the 
plaintiff can recover $300 in compensatory damages.  This $300 
provides the plaintiff with the benefit of the bargain, mainly the profit he 
expected to make through the transaction.  Again per the majority rule, if 
the representation was merely negligent, the plaintiff could recover only 
$50 in compensatory damages.  This $50 covers the plaintiff’s out-of-
pocket losses—the difference between the price he paid and the actual 
value of what he received. 
But is the plaintiff not in the exact same position after the transaction 
regardless of whether the defendant’s misrepresentation was fraudulent 
or negligent?  Using the example above, the plaintiff is left with a good 
                                                     
 120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552B cmt. b. 
 121. See id. § 552 cmt. a.  The difference in liability is due to the distinction between a duty of 
care and a duty of honesty.  Id.  The duty of honesty is implicit in every transaction, whereas the 
duty of care will exist only in certain circumstances.  Id.  Those certain circumstances include when 
the defendant has a pecuniary interest in the representation, which is presumed if the defendant gives 
the representation within his business, profession, or employment.  See id. § 552 cmts. a & d. 
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worth only $200 after expecting to receive a good worth $500.  The 
plaintiff is no worse off because the defendant acted fraudulently instead 
of negligently.  To the contrary, the plaintiff is left in this same position 
and suffers the exact same injury, including disappointed expectations, 
regardless of whether the defendant made a fraudulent or negligent 
misrepresentation.122 
Even though the plaintiff is left in the same position, the amount of 
damages necessary to make the plaintiff whole differs based on whether 
the defendant knew of the falsity or was negligent concerning the falsity.  
The unavailability of benefit-of-the-bargain damages for negligent 
misrepresentation shows that benefit-of-the-bargain damages have little 
to do with compensating the plaintiff for the injury suffered. 
2. The Amount of Compensatory Damages Recoverable for Other Torts 
Does Not Vary Based on the Defendant’s Mindset 
The amount of compensatory damages in tort law is based on the 
injury or damage that the plaintiff suffered.123  Suppose that the plaintiff 
is physically injured as a result of the defendant’s conduct.  Regardless 
of whether the plaintiff sues the defendant for battery or negligence, the 
amount of compensatory damages is the same.124  The same holds true 
for property damages.  Regardless of whether the plaintiff sues for 
trespass to chattels or negligence, a successful plaintiff should recover 
the same amount of compensatory or actual damages.125 
The same does not hold true, however, for misrepresentation torts, 
where, under the majority rule, the amount of compensatory damages 
                                                     
 122. The Second Restatement claims that the limited liability in negligence “promotes the 
important social policy of encouraging the flow of commercial information upon which the 
operation of the economy rests.”  Id. § 552 cmt. a.  Liability is not limited for fraudulent 
misrepresentation because “no interest of society is served by promoting the flow of information not 
genuinely believed by its maker to be true.”  Id.  This marks a departure from the First Restatement’s 
distinction based on whether the fraudulent misrepresentation occurred within a business transaction, 
within which the vigilance against fraud should be relaxed because businesses do not owe any duty 
to be completely frank in their dealings.  See discussion supra note 57. 
Regardless, if tort law truly wants to encourage due diligence and the flow of accurate 
commercial information, courts should allow the recovery of benefit-of-the-bargain damages for 
negligent misrepresentation.  False representations cause damage because of their falsity.  Making 
benefit-of-the-bargain damages available for negligent misrepresentation would encourage greater 
diligence and ensure accuracy in commercial dealings. 
 123. See generally supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text. 
 124. These damages will likely include lost wages, medical expenses, and pain and suffering.  2 
DOBBS, supra note 7, § 8.1(1), at 357. 
 125. See 1 DOBBS, supra note 7, § 5.13(1), at 836–37 (explaining that the general damages of 
market value typically apply to both scenarios). 
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recoverable for misrepresentation differs based on whether the claim is 
fraud or negligence.  If the defendant was merely negligent, the plaintiff 
can only recover his out-of-pocket losses.126  The defendant’s conduct is 
irrelevant in this measure.  If the defendant acted fraudulently, however, 
the plaintiff can recover the benefit of the bargain.  The defendant’s 
conduct controls this measure of damages. 
Thus, the amount of damages necessary to make a plaintiff whole 
after a misrepresentation depends not on the nature or extent of the 
plaintiff’s injury but instead on the defendant’s culpability.  Is a 
fraudulent misrepresentation so reprehensible that it qualifies for a 
special rule of damages?  Surely, the defendant committing purposeful 
battery (and causing physical injury) acts reprehensibly, but the plaintiff 
will not receive any extra compensation for that reprehensibility.  There 
is nothing special about fraudulent misrepresentation to justify a special 
measure of damages.  As courts have observed, the “law fixing the 
measure of damages for tort is based upon the proposition that 
compensatory damages should be, and in the case of every other tort 
known to the law [except fraudulent misrepresentation] are, measured by 
the result or effect of the tort rather than by the tort itself.”127 
                                                     
 126. 2 DOBBS, supra note 7, § 9.2(2), at 554. 
 127. Hallen v. Martin, 167 N.W. 314, 323 (S.D. 1918) (Whiting & Gates, JJ., dissenting).  The 
dissenting opinion in Hallen eloquently discusses that the benefit-of-the-bargain measure of 
damages for fraudulent misrepresentation is inconsistent with the measure of damages for all other 
torts: 
[I]t is clear that the “majority” rule is founded upon the assumption, that compensatory 
damages should be measured by the tort itself—by the false representations; that the 
greater, the more numerous, the representations, in other words, the more heinous the 
tort, the greater should be the recovery, and this regardless of the results that flow from 
the representations. . . . It is because of this very fundamental error—this very fact that 
the “majority” rule has, as to this one peculiar tort, disregarded the rule governing 
damages for every other known tort—that the “majority” rule stands upon a basis both 
unsound and exceptional.  Attempt to apply to any other tort the rule that there is a direct 
relation between the amount of compensatory damages that should be recovered and the 
number, the moral gravity, or the enormity of the torts committed, and see to what result 
one would arrive.  It is true that there must be a tort, else there is no wrong upon which to 
base recovery; but unless the tort, as a cause, produces an effect detrimental to the 
innocent person, there can be no recoverable damages; and whenever compensatory 
damages are recoverable they should always be measured by the effect produced by the 
tort, and not by the tort itself.  We cannot logically measure damages by the cause in the 
case of one tort, and by the effect in the case of some other tort, but, if we do, we should 
at least concede that we are using two rules for such measurements. 
Id. (emphasis added); see also Barton, supra note 94, at 1825 (“Unlike other tort claims that seek to 
compensate the injured party, fraud seeks to remedy the wrong by restoring to the plaintiff what the 
defendant has taken wrongfully.”). 
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VI. THE AVAILABILITY OF COMPENSATORY BENEFIT-OF-THE-BARGAIN 
DAMAGES IN CONTRACT DOES NOT JUSTIFY THEIR AVAILABILITY 
IN TORT 
Courts likely are comfortable awarding benefit-of-the-bargain 
damages as compensatory damages for fraudulent misrepresentation 
because they are available as compensatory damages for breach of 
contract.128  The additional “allegation of intent to deceive should 
certainly not decrease” the potential recovery.129  And “it is difficult to 
see why identical damages do not flow from false representations of facts 
which would flow from false warranties of the identical facts.”130 
A breach of contract and a fraudulent misrepresentation, however, 
are different wrongs, meaning that the resulting damages may differ.  
Unlike in contract law, the parties’ expectations do not control liability or 
the scope of compensatory remedies in tort.  Further, the various 
justifications for awarding benefit-of-the-bargain damages for breach of 
contract do not support awarding the same damages for fraudulent 
misrepresentation. 
A. The Breach of Contract, Not the Fraudulent Misrepresentation, 
Causes the Loss of the Bargain 
Within the breach-of-contract context, benefit-of-the-bargain 
damages monetarily mandate contract performance.  By analogy, perhaps 
compensatory damages for fraudulent misrepresentation should have a 
similar effect.  Just as benefit-of-the-bargain damages effect contract 
performance in contract, benefit-of-the-bargain damages should make the 
defendant’s misrepresentation true in tort.131  Under this view, the falsity 
of the representation is the tort.132  Compensatory damages then remedy 
                                                     
 128. See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 121, at 451–52 
(1935) (explaining that awarding benefit-of-the-bargain damages for fraudulent misrepresentation is 
consistent with the measure of damages awarded for breach of contract, making it easier to apply 
benefit-of-the-bargain damages in fraud claims); see also Monserud, supra note 35, at 483 
(explaining the common sentiment in the case law that “deliberate fraud (deceit) must not yield 
lesser damages than ‘mere breach of warranty’”). 
 129. KEETON ET AL., supra note 68, § 110, at 768. 
 130. Hallen, 167 N.W. at 319 (Smith, J., concurring). 
 131. See id. (“The [benefit-of-the-bargain damages] rule awards the injured party an amount 
which makes good the representations.”). 
 132. See id. at 318 (“The essential wrong was in the falsity of the representations relating to the 
value, or relating to the value or qualities, of the thing which the injured party was induced to accept 
instead of that which he was entitled to receive.”).  Reframing the tort in this way enables avoidance 
of a common sense application of compensatory damages.  The purpose of compensatory damages is 
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that falsity by awarding the amount necessary to make the representation 
true.133 
Still, making the representation true could mean two things—either 
we pretend the defendant truthfully stated the actual value of the good or 
the good was actually worth the amount that the defendant represented.  
In the former possibility, the likely result is that the bargain would not 
have occurred.  If the purchase price was $250 and the defendant 
truthfully represented that the good was worth only $200, the plaintiff 
would not agree to the transaction.134  If no bargain would occur, the 
plaintiff could not have any benefit-of-the-bargain damages. 
The second possibility is that we pretend that the good is actually 
worth the amount the defendant represented.  If the representation that 
the good is worth $500 was actually true and the plaintiff actually 
entered into a contract to purchase the good, the plaintiff would have 
expected a profit of $250.  In this possibility, “if the representations had 
been true instead of false, the injured party would have received property 
‘answering to the representations made.’”135  Therefore, “[t]he difference 
between [the good’s] value as represented and its actual value . . .  
 
                                                                                                                       
to put the plaintiff back to the same place he was before the tort occurred—as if the 
misrepresentation never occurred.  See supra note 22 and accompanying text.  If the tort is the falsity 
of the representation, however, damages presume that the representation still occurred and that the 
compensatory damages should put the plaintiff in the same position as if the representation had been 
true. 
 133. Conceptually, difficulty arises when attempting to separate the falsity of the representation 
from the representation itself.  In fraudulent misrepresentation, the representation was false when 
made and no possibility ever existed that the representation was true.  Why then should the measure 
of damages pretend that the representation was true?  This is unlike a breach of contract where the 
defendant intended to perform when he entered into the contract but later chose to not perform.  A 
possibility of performance existed in the breach-of-contract context, but no possibility of truth ever 
existed in the fraudulent misrepresentation context. 
Additionally, the idea of making the representation true within the measure of damages is 
inconsistent with the measure of damages for other torts.  Damages for battery do not presume that 
the contact still occurred and that the harmfulness of the contact is the tort.  Further, damages for 
battery do not compensate the plaintiff based on the benefits the plaintiff would have experienced 
had the contact been beneficial instead of harmful.  For further discussion of how the benefit-of-the-
bargain measure of damages for fraudulent misrepresentation differs from the measure of damages 
applicable to other torts, see supra Part V.B. 
Lastly, if the falsity of the misrepresentation is the tort, this is a further basis for arguing that 
liability for negligent misrepresentation—also involving a false representation—should also award 
benefit-of-the-bargain damages.  See generally supra Part V.B (arguing that if benefit-of-the-bargain 
damages were truly compensatory, they would be available for negligent misrepresentation). 
 134. See Hallen, 167 N.W. at 320 (Whiting & Gates, JJ., dissenting) (“An action for damages for 
deceit in all cases, whether those involving sales or exchanges of property or whatsoever the nature 
of the case, must be based upon the premise that, if it had not been for the deceit, there would have 
been no purchase or exchange whatsoever.”). 
 135. Id. at 318. 
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measures the loss or damage proximately caused by the deceit,”136 
meaning that damages should total $250. 
This second possibility blurs the distinction between the fraudulent 
misrepresentation and the later contract to purchase the good at issue in 
the misrepresentation—it assumes that the misrepresentation itself causes 
both the expected profit and receipt of the good.  That the representation 
alone cannot create the expectation is apparent once the representation is 
separated from the transaction.  The representation is that a good is worth 
$500 and nothing more.  The representation invites reliance, but it does 
not bind the person making the representation to do anything.137  Further, 
any resulting reliance on the representation cannot cause the plaintiff to 
expect to purchase the good and make a profit.138  Rationally, the 
plaintiff cannot expect to purchase the good before he actually makes an 
offer to purchase that the seller accepts.  The representation may increase 
the plaintiff’s interest in the good, but an expected profit is only possible 
if the plaintiff and the defendant enter into a contract. 
The plaintiff would likely argue that he relied on that representation 
in agreeing to purchase the good.  But if the representation were true, the 
plaintiff still would have no damages without the defendant’s contractual 
agreement to sell the good.  Without the agreed-upon purchase price in 
the contract, the plaintiff still could not expect a specific profit.  The 
contract is necessary before the plaintiff can expect any profit.139 
                                                     
 136. Id. 
 137. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 
11 (1981) (rejecting the argument that the promisor is bound to pay expectation damages in contract 
simply because the promise invites the promisee to rely on the promise).  Fried explains: 
  Perhaps the statement of intention in promising is binding because we not only 
foresee reliance, we invite it: We intend the promisee to rely on the promise.  Yet even 
this will not do.  If I invite reliance on my stated intention, then that is all I invite. . . . [I 
am not] bound as I would be had I promised. 
  A promise invokes trust in my future actions, not merely in my present sincerity.  We 
need to isolate an additional element, over and above benefit, reliance, and the 
communication of intention.  That additional element must commit me, and commit me to 
more than the truth of some statement. 
Id. 
 138. To recover for misrepresentation, the plaintiff has to prove that his reliance on the 
representation was reasonable.  See infra note 180 and accompanying text.  Within this required 
element, the plaintiff should also have to prove that his understanding of the representation was 
reasonable.  If the defendant merely represents the value of a good, the plaintiff cannot be led to 
believe that he would thus automatically be able to purchase the good and make a profit on it. 
 139. See, e.g., Goodrich & Pennington Mortg. Fund, Inc. v. J.R. Woolard, Inc., 101 P.3d 792, 
796 (Nev. 2004) (explaining that benefit-of-the-bargain damages put the parties in the “same 
position as if the contract and representations had been fully performed” (quoting Lightning Litho, 
Inc. v. Danka Indus., 776 N.E.2d 1238, 1242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (emphasis added))). 
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Similarly, the receipt of the expected profit is only possible if the 
plaintiff and the defendant enter into a contract.  The plaintiff’s “right to 
receive the kind of thing contracted for was fixed by the contract” and 
not the misrepresentation.140  The idea that “if the representations had 
been true instead of false, the injured party would have received property 
‘answering to the representations made’”141 is simply incorrect.  Even if 
the representation was true, the injured party would have received the 
property only if he had a contractual claim to it.142 
The only point at which the plaintiff truly has an expectation of 
profit or other benefit is when the plaintiff and the defendant have 
entered into a contract regarding the good at issue, even if the good’s 
value is the subject of a misrepresentation.143  The misrepresentation of 
value does not create any expectation and the compensatory damages for 
a fraudulent misrepresentation should not fulfill any lost expectation.  If 
the plaintiff wants to recover the expected benefit based on the agreed-
upon purchase price, the plaintiff should sue for breach of contract. 
B. Expectations Do Not Control the Duty and the Amount of Damages 
in Tort Law 
Even if the misrepresentation could cause an expectation, that 
expectation does not have the same relevance in tort law that it does in 
                                                     
 140. Hallen, 167 N.W. at 318 (Smith, J., concurring).  The concurrence believed that “the 
injured party was entitled to receive that which he was induced to believe he was receiving, and 
which he would have received under an honest contract.”  Id.  The Hallen majority used the same 
analysis to conclude that the plaintiff was entitled to benefit-of-the-bargain damages because of the 
misrepresentation.  See id. (“That he did not receive [the thing contracted for] was due to the deceit 
which wrongfully induced him to believe he was receiving it when he was not in fact receiving it.”).  
But the Hallen court’s conclusion does not follow from the analysis.  The court admitted that the 
plaintiff’s right to receive existed only because of the contract.  Thus, the misrepresentation did not 
entitle the plaintiff to receipt, and its falsity could thus have not caused the plaintiff’s nonreceipt. 
 141. Id. at 318. 
 142. Similarly, the idea that benefit-of-the-bargain damages for fraudulent misrepresentation will 
provide the plaintiff “any economic gains he would have had if the representations had been correct” 
is flawed.  2 DOBBS, supra note 7, § 9.2(1), at 551.  If the representations were indeed correct, the 
plaintiff would not necessarily achieve any economic gains; the plaintiff’s contractual entitlement to 
the good is a necessary part of his achieving economic gains. 
 143. “[T]he courts have restricted recovery to those losses which might be expected to follow 
from the fraud and from events that are reasonably foreseeable.”  KEETON ET AL., supra note 68,  
§ 110, at 767.  The formation of a contract to purchase the good at issue in the misrepresentation is 
an event expected to follow from the defendant’s fraudulent misrepresentation.  Still, any damages 
recoverable for fraudulent misrepresentation are limited by the purposes of tort law.  See supra Part 
II.B.  Thus, even if a contract and the breach of the contract are reasonably foreseeable after a 
fraudulent misrepresentation, tort law does not allow compensation of a lost expectation because 
such compensation would award the plaintiff the value of a good that the plaintiff did not own (or 
have a contractual right to) before the misrepresentation occurred. 
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contract law.  An award of benefit-of-the-bargain damages is appropriate 
for breach of contract but not for fraudulent misrepresentation. 
Within a contract, the parties’ promises define the duties owed and 
the expectations resulting from those duties.  Those same expectations 
define the amount of compensatory damages: “[C]ompensation is 
defined by the parties’ own promises and the risks they undertook.”144  
For instance, the defendant may have agreed to dig the plaintiff a well for 
a certain price to enable plaintiff to get water to his cattle.  The amount 
of compensatory damages is then based on the risk that the defendant 
agreed to protect against, mainly the risk that the cattle would not have 
water.145  The recoverable expectation-based compensatory damages in 
contract would monetarily put the plaintiff in the same position as if the 
well provided his cattle with water.  This measure of damages is 
consistent with the purpose of compensatory damages in contract law: to 
put the nonbreaching plaintiff in the same position as if the breach had 
not occurred.146 
The parties’ expectations play a very different role in tort law.  
External societal law determines whether a tort-based duty exists.147  For 
instance, tort law imposes on an attorney a duty to use reasonable care in 
representing a client.148  The client may also expect the attorney to 
exercise care, but the client’s expectation alone does not give rise to the 
duty.  The client’s expectation similarly does not control the amount of 
compensatory damages.  Instead, external societal law declares that the 
amount of compensatory damages for legal malpractice is “‘the amount 
of loss actually sustained by the [client]’” as a result of the lawyer’s 
conduct.149 
                                                     
 144. 3 DOBBS, supra note 7, § 12.1(1), at 6. 
 145. See id. 
 146. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 147. See Jody Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract and Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1603, 
1613–15 (2009) (distinguishing between tort law’s enforcement of moral duties and contract law’s 
enforcement of voluntarily undertaken moral obligations). 
 148. See, e.g., Wettanen v. Cowper, 749 P.2d 362, 364 (Alaska 1988); TJD Dissolution Corp. v. 
Savoie Supply Co., 460 N.W.2d 59, 62 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). 
 149. See Black v. Shultz, 530 F.3d 702, 709 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bellino v. McGrath North 
Mullin & Kratz, PC LLO, 738 N.W.2d 434, 445 (Neb. 2007)).  Although it may seem it, this is not 
an expectation-based measure of damage.  The client may have expected to obtain a judgment, but 
the client had a viable claim, which has monetary worth.  If the client is unable to recover damages 
for the claim because of the attorney’s malpractice, the client has an actual loss as opposed to a mere 
disappointed expectation. 
Certain torts do compensate for a lost expectation, but only if the expectation arose due to a 
source other than the defendant.  These torts include intentional interference with contract or 
business expectancy.  The measure of damages recoverable for either of these torts likely includes 
loss of the benefit of the contract that the plaintiff had with a nonparty.  See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 774A(1)(a) (1979) (providing for damages based on “the pecuniary loss of the 
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Consistent with the rest of tort law, the party’s expectation does not 
control the existence of a duty in fraudulent misrepresentation.  Instead, 
tort law imposes an “unequivocal” duty of honesty when making 
representations.150  Obviously, a plaintiff may also expect a defendant to 
be honest when providing representations, but the duty is “unequivocal” 
regardless of the expectation.151  Because the party’s expectation does 
not control the existence of the duty, the party’s expectation also should 
not control the amount of compensatory damages for fraudulent 
misrepresentation.152  Instead, the amount of compensatory damages 
should be based on the actual loss.  This actual loss measure is not only 
consistent with the measure of compensatory damages in other torts, it 
“is [also] more consistent with the purpose of tort remedies, which is to 
compensate the plaintiff for a loss sustained, rather than to give him the 
benefit of any contract bargain.”153 
Moreover, basing compensatory damages on expectations is 
consistent with both parties’ expectations in contract, but not in tort.  The 
effect of awarding expectation-based compensatory damages for breach 
of contract is that both parties perform the obligations they agreed and 
expected to perform.154  In tort, however, benefit-of-the-bargain damages 
do not cause both parties to perform their expected obligations.155  This is 
                                                                                                                       
benefits of the contract or the prospective relation”); KEETON ET AL., supra note 68, § 129, at 1003 
(observing that states have adopted one of three different measures of damages: a contract measure, 
a measure similar to that recoverable for negligence, or a measure similar to that recoverable for an 
intentional tort).  Similarly, damages for lost future wages are based on the plaintiff’s expectation of 
receiving wages in the future.  The plaintiff’s expectation of a benefit from a contract or future 
wages exists before and independent of the defendant’s tortious conduct.  If the source of the 
expectation is independent of the defendant and the plaintiff can prove the existence of that 
expectation, its loss should be compensated in tort. 
In cases of fraudulent misrepresentation, however, the defendant’s misrepresentation does not 
create an expectation.  See supra Part VI.A.  Even if it did, the loss of the expectation would not be 
compensable in tort.  Instead, that lost expectation is compensable through contract and contractual 
warranty claims.  If the plaintiff wants to ensure his ability to sue based on any representations, he 
should negotiate for contractual warranties. 
 150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. a (1977). 
 151. Id.  The Second Restatement discusses that “any user of commercial information may 
reasonably expect the observance of this [honesty] standard,” but the duty is “unequivocal” 
regardless of the existence of the expectation.  Id. 
 152. Further, if there were some special justification for an award of benefit-of-the-bargain 
damages for the expectation that the defendant created through a fraudulent misrepresentation, that 
same justification should support an award of benefit-of-the-bargain damages for a claim of 
negligent misrepresentation.  In both claims, the defendant creates an expectation through a false 
representation.  See supra Part V.B. 
 153. KEETON ET AL., supra note 68, § 110, at 768; see also supra Part II.B. 
 154. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 155. But see Kendrick v. Ryus, 123 S.W. 937, 940 (Mo. 1909) (concluding that benefit-of-the-
bargain damages are a reasonable measure of damages because they give effect to both parties’ 
expectations).  The Kendrick court analyzed as follows: 
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because a representation regarding future actions or constituting a 
promise to perform is an actionable misrepresentation only if the 
defendant has no intent or expectation to perform at the time he makes 
the representation.156  The defendant never intended for the 
                                                                                                                       
But for the fact that the purchaser thought he was getting a bargain he might not have 
made the contract at all.  If by fraud and deceit he is induced to believe that he is 
contracting for a benefit or a bargain, and not merely swapping dollars, why should not 
the benefits of the bargain be an element in the measure of damages in an action for fraud 
and deceit?  Such benefit would be a matter fully contemplated by both parties.  By the 
purchaser, because, as a rule, trades are not made for the purpose of merely exchanging 
dollars.  By the seller, because he would not falsely represent the character of the 
property save and except to induce the purchaser to believe that he was procuring a 
benefit of bargain.  Being, therefore, a matter fully contemplated by both parties, we are 
impressed with the reasonableness of the rule which allows the “benefits of the bargain” 
as a proper element of damages in cases of fraud and deceit. 
Id.  This analysis looks only to whether the seller expected the purchaser to perform and not whether 
the seller expected himself to perform.  Even if the purchaser expected the seller to perform, the 
seller never expected to perform because the seller was aware of the falsity of representation when 
he made it. 
 156. See, e.g., CADCO, Inc. v. Fleetwood Enters., 220 S.W.3d 426, 436 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) 
(“It is well-settled that an unkept promise does not constitute actionable fraud unless the promise is 
accompanied by the defendant’s present intent not to perform, which constitutes a misrepresentation 
of a present state of mind, itself an existent fact.”). 
Remarkably, the Second Restatement embraces the idea that the plaintiff can pursue a 
fraudulent misrepresentation and receive benefit-of-the-bargain damages even when the underlying 
bargain is unenforceable: 
The intention to perform the agreement may be expressed but it is normally merely to be 
implied from the making of the agreement.  Since a promise necessarily carries with it the 
implied assertion of an intention to perform it follows that a promise made without such 
an intention is fraudulent and actionable in deceit under the rule stated in § 525.  This is 
true whether or not the promise is enforceable as a contract.  If it is enforceable, the 
person misled by the representation has a cause of action in tort as an alternative at least, 
and perhaps in some instances in addition to his cause of action on the contract.  If the 
agreement is not enforceable as a contract, as when it is without consideration, the 
recipient still has, as his only remedy, the action in deceit under the rule stated in § 525.  
The same is true when the agreement is oral and made unenforceable by the statute of 
frauds, or when it is unprovable and so unenforceable under the parol evidence rule.  The 
tort action may have other advantages, as when it is subject to a longer statute of 
limitations.  In all of these cases, it is immaterial to the tort liability that the damages 
recoverable are identical with, or substantially the same as, those which could have been 
recovered in an action of contract if the promise were enforceable. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 530 cmt. c.  Although this Restatement provision appears to 
allow fraudulent misrepresentation claims to proceed even when the underlying bargain is 
unenforceable, it is not clear that the plaintiff would be able to do so.  The commentary to section 
549, which provides for benefit-of-the-bargain damages, seems to assume that the underlying 
bargain between the plaintiff and the defendant must be enforceable.  See id. § 549(2) (“The 
recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation in a business transaction is also entitled to recover 
additional damages sufficient to give him the benefit of his contract with the maker . . . .” (emphasis 
added)).  The commentary states: “When the plaintiff has not entered into any transaction with the 
defendant but has suffered his pecuniary loss through reliance upon the misrepresentation in dealing 
with a third person, [out-of-pocket losses is] the rule[] that must of necessity be applied.”  Id. § 549 
cmt. g; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 68, § 110, at 768 (stating that out-of-pocket losses “must 
of necessity be adopted where the defendant is a third party who has made no contract with the 
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representation to be true or to perform, but awarding benefit-of-the-
bargain damages for the misrepresentation requires him to do so.157  The 
contract law sentiment that benefit-of-the-bargain damages merely 
require parties to carry out their agreed-upon, expected performances 
does not apply equally to the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation. 
C. Various Justifications for Compensatory Benefit-of-the-Bargain 
Damages in Contract Law Do Not Apply to Tort Law 
Even in contract law, commentators have questioned the 
appropriateness of measuring compensatory damages based on the 
benefit of the bargain.158  Commentators have created various 
justifications for the measure of damages.  Regardless of the wisdom of 
the justifications, they do not support an award of benefit-of-the-bargain-
based compensatory damages for fraudulent misrepresentation.159 
1. Any Alleged Expectation Lacks Present Cash Value 
One justification for the compensation of expectancies for breach of 
contract is that, although contract performance will occur in the future, 
that future performance has present value.   
 
Expectations of future values become . . . present values.  In a society 
in which credit has become a significant and pervasive institution, it is 
inevitable that the expectancy created by an enforceable promise should 
be regarded as a kind of property, and breach of the promise as an 
injury to that property.160 
                                                                                                                       
plaintiff”). 
 157. Proponents of benefit-of-the-bargain damages would argue that the defendant’s lack of 
intent should not excuse him.  This is a common argument; the wrongdoer should not be subject to 
lesser damages for his fraud than for his breach of contract.  This argument, however, does not 
necessarily mandate that benefit-of-the-bargain damages be available as compensatory damages. 
 158. See Farnsworth, supra note 6, at 1148 (criticizing benefit-of-the-bargain damages as a 
“queer kind of ‘compensation’” because “it gives the promisee something he never had” (quoting 
Fuller & Perdue, supra note 12, at 53)). 
 159. If any of the justifications supported an award of benefit-of-the-bargain damages for 
fraudulent misrepresentations, the justifications would also support an award of benefit-of-the-
bargain damages for negligent misrepresentation. 
 160. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 12, at 59.  Fuller and Perdue actually rejected this justification 
because it is a circular argument—expectancies have present values because the law enforces them.  
Id.  If the present value of expectancies is due to the enforceability of the expectancy, expectancies 
allegedly created by fraudulent misrepresentation would also have present value.  Regardless, 
commentators have rejected any claim that the circularity defeats the present value of contractual 
expectations: 
Even if it were a fact that contracts (i.e., enforceable promises) have present value only 
because the law enforces them (i.e., because the law awards expectation damages), that 
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a. Present Cash Value Depends on the Existence of Sufficient 
Consideration 
A contractual expectation itself is the plaintiff’s property; the 
property interest being a credit or entitlement to fulfillment of the 
expectation.161  The plaintiff, however, must own or have a right to this 
credit.  An enforceable right to the fulfillment of the expectation exists 
only if the contract is supported by sufficient consideration.162  If the 
plaintiff has provided sufficient consideration, “the promisee has formed 
an attitude of expectancy such that a breach of the promise causes him to 
feel that he has been ‘deprived’ of something which was ‘his.’”163  But if 
the plaintiff has not provided sufficient consideration to support the 
contract, it’s not as easy to conclude that the plaintiff has been deprived 
of something that was “his.”  To the contrary, the expectation is 
unenforceable and has no present value. 
In the typical fraudulent misrepresentation claim, the plaintiff does 
not “own” the alleged expectation because he has not given any 
consideration.  Unlike the situation where a buyer has agreed to purchase 
a good from the seller—a contract supported by consideration—a 
recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation has not agreed to do anything 
in exchange for the misrepresentation.  To ultimately recover on the 
fraudulent misrepresentation, the plaintiff will have to establish reliance 
on the misrepresentation to his detriment.  But reliance to his detriment is 
not the same thing as consideration, as in actually paying for the 
expectation.  In the commercial setting, property is obtained through 
 
                                                                                                                       
would not prevent the fact that the credit system treats contracts as property from being 
an institutional justification for the expectation measure.  For if the credit system requires 
the use of the expectation measure to function effectively, as Fuller and Perdue 
acknowledged it does, this is all that matters for justification purposes. It is irrelevant 
whether the credit system or the expectation measure came first historically. 
W. David Slawson, Why Expectation Damages for Breach of Contract Must Be the Norm: A 
Refutation of the Fuller and Perdue “Three Interests” Thesis, 81 NEB. L. REV. 839, 859 (2003). 
 161. See infra notes 168–70 and accompanying text. 
 162. Promises within a contract are enforceable only if supported by sufficient consideration.  
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981) (discussing the performance or 
promise necessary to constitute consideration).  The Second Restatement of Contracts concludes that 
in cases of promissory estoppel—such as an enforceable contract despite the lack of sufficient 
consideration—benefit-of-the-bargain damages may not be appropriate.  Id. § 90 cmt. d (“[R]elief 
may sometimes be limited to restitution or to damages or specific relief measured by the extent of 
the promisee’s reliance rather than by the terms of the promise.”).  But see W. David Slawson, The 
Role of Reliance in Contract Damages, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 197, 236–37 (1990) (arguing that 
courts refuse to use a measure of damages other than benefit-of-the-bargain in promissory estoppel 
claims). 
 163. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 12, at 57. 
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purchase.  Buyers cannot skirt the purchase requirement through mere 
reliance. 
Reliance also cannot create an enforceable property right.164  To base 
a property interest on an expectation, “a person clearly must have more 
than an abstract need or desire for” the expectation, and the expectation 
cannot be merely unilateral.165  Instead, the plaintiff would need to show 
“a legitimate claim of entitlement” to the expectation.166  Without some 
consideration, the plaintiff lacks a legitimate claim of entitlement to the 
expectation allegedly created by a fraudulent misrepresentation. 
b. Present Cash Value Depends on the Assignability of the Expectation 
Another reason that contractually created expectations constitute 
property is that contractual rights are assignable.167  “If something can be 
bought and sold, it is property . . . . As such, any contract right that can 
be assigned is property . . . and, as a rule, the law allows any contract 
right to be assigned.”168  Assignable contract rights include the right to 
performance of the contract—fulfillment of the assigned expectation.169  
The expectation measure is thus “the value of a contract right in the 
market economy,” based on the valuation of the expectation resulting 
from the contract right.170 
Unlike a contractually created expectation, any expectation allegedly 
resulting from a fraudulent misrepresentation cannot be assigned.  A 
                                                     
 164. According to Fuller and Perdue, “[t]hat the promisee had not ‘used’ the property which the 
promise represents (had not relied on the promise) is . . . immaterial” to the present value of a 
contractual expectation.  Id. at 59. 
 165. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Slawson, supra note 160, at 861 (“It was not, as Fuller and Perdue maintained, the general 
enforceability of promises that made contract rights property, rather . . . it was the general 
assignability of contract rights.” (footnotes omitted)).  Slawson admits that an unassignable contract 
right can still constitute a property interest.  See id. at 846 n.22.  These contractual rights in 
employment, however, are property interests because of the employee’s “legitimate claim of 
entitlement” to employment due to the contract’s terms.  See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. 
 168. Slawson, supra note 160, at 845. 
 169. Slawson characterizes the benefit-of-the-bargain measure of damages as “the value of a 
contract right in a market economy.”  Id. at 849.  A plaintiff in a fraudulent misrepresentation claim 
should not be compensated based on “the value of a contract right in a market economy.”  This 
measure of compensation is even more inappropriate in tort law if the lost contract right is 
unenforceable. 
 170. Id.  Slawson argues that even if the law did not enforce contractual expectations, the 
expectation would still have present value due to “[a]ll sorts of other factors—honor, reputation, 
reciprocity (‘I will keep my promises to you if you keep yours to me.’), and simple honesty, for 
example.”  Id. at 860.  Honor, reputation, and honesty may also create some present value for an 
expectation allegedly created by a fraudulent misrepresentation.  Reciprocity, however, would not 
apply to fraudulent misrepresentations because of the lack of consideration. 
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misrepresentation does not create any tangible “right” to the fulfilled 
expectation that could be assigned.171  A recipient of a misrepresentation, 
like that a good is worth $500, cannot assign the receipt to another.  Any 
expectation based on the misrepresentation thus cannot have present 
value.172 
2. Tort Law Does Not Contemplate Efficient Breaches of Contract 
Another justification for benefit-of-the-bargain damages is that it is 
the only measure of damages to ensure efficient breaches of contract.173  
Contract law encourages parties to breach contracts when the breach 
would be economically efficient.174  Without expectation-based damages, 
a party would not be able to determine the economic efficiency of 
breaching.175 
The concept of efficient breach does not apply to misrepresentation 
torts.  In an efficient breach, a defendant initially agrees to the contract 
but later decides to breach because of the economic efficiency.  When a 
defendant makes a fraudulent misrepresentation, however, the 
representation is false at the time of the tort—either the statement of fact 
is false, or, if the representation is promissory, the defendant lacks the 
intent to perform at the time.176  Similarly, the defendant must have the 
intent to deceive at the time of making the misrepresentation.177  Because 
of the falsity of the representation and the fraudulent intent at the time of 
                                                     
 171. Some nonassignable contract rights, including a right to employment, are property with 
present value even though the right is not assignable.  Still, those expectations are supported by 
consideration.  See supra notes 164–66 and accompanying text (explaining that reliance is 
insufficient to create a property right). 
 172. Generally, tort claims are not assignable if they are “personal” in nature.  TMJ Haw., Inc. v. 
Nippon Trust Bank, 153 P.3d 444, 452 (Haw. 2007).  Personal injury claims or claims based on 
emotional distress are not assignable.  See id.  Tort claims for damage to real or personal property 
are assignable, especially when the assignee has purchased the damaged property.  Id.  There is a 
difference between assigning an entire claim and assigning an expectation allegedly resulting from a 
misrepresentation.  When the claim is assigned, damage has already occurred; so property is already 
damaged and the assignee can recover the property damage.  If the plaintiff has merely heard the 
misrepresentation, however, the plaintiff has nothing to assign. 
 173. See Slawson, supra note 160, at 855 (“Only the expectation measure provides the right 
incentives for making breaches Pareto efficient, [meaning that] this measure leaves the party who 
did not breach neither worse nor better off than if the contract had been performed.”). 
 174. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 
708, 730–33 (2007). 
 175. But see Slawson, supra note 160, at 855 (arguing that efficient breaches do not justify 
benefit-of-the-bargain damages “because most breaches result from human weakness or 
miscalculation—carelessness, mistake, laziness, scheduling too many jobs to do at the same time, 
etc.—rather than from a conscious decision to breach”). 
 176. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 cmts. d & f (1977). 
 177. See id. § 525. 
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the representation, the concept of efficient breach cannot apply to 
misrepresentation torts.  Obviously then, the need to enable efficient 
breaches could not justify an award of benefit-of-the-bargain damages 
for fraudulent misrepresentation. 
3. Tort Law Has No Interest in Encouraging Commercial Activity 
Even though the damages in contract give the plaintiff something he 
did not have before the contract was made, benefit-of-the-bargain 
damages are still justified and beneficial because they encourage people 
to make contracts.178  The purposes of tort law do not include 
encouraging people to enter into contracts.179  Thus, this effect of benefit-
of-the-bargain damages does not justify the availability of such damages 
for fraudulent misrepresentation. 
One could argue that the tort equivalent of encouraging commercial 
activity is encouraging reliance; thus, benefit-of-the-bargain damages 
should be available because such damages would encourage people to 
rely on representations.  But tort law does not want people to blindly rely 
on representations.  In fact, tort law discourages blind reliance; before a 
plaintiff can recover damages for fraudulent misrepresentation, he must 
demonstrate that his reliance on the representation was reasonable or 
justifiable.180  Encouraging people to make contracts has no parallel in 
tort law to justify an award of benefit-of-the-bargain damages for 
fraudulent misrepresentation. 
                                                     
 178. See Farnsworth, supra note 6, at 1148 (criticizing benefit-of-the-bargain damages as a 
“queer kind of ‘compensation’” because “it gives the promisee something he never had” but 
justifying the existence of benefit-of-the-bargain damages to encourage people to make contracts 
(quoting Fuller & Perdue, supra note 12, at 53)); see also Slawson, supra note 160, at 845 
(“Although many contracts presumably would be made and kept even if the law did not enforce 
them, the law’s enforcing them encourages the making of more of them and increases the value of 
those that are made by providing an important additional assurance that they will be kept.”). 
 179. See supra Part II.B. 
 180. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525.  Tort law also sometimes obligates the 
plaintiff to investigate the subject of the representations before the reliance can be reasonable.  See 
id. § 541 cmt. a (“Although the recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation is not barred from 
recovery because he could have discovered its falsity if he had shown his distrust of the maker’s 
honesty by investigating its truth, he is nonetheless required to use his senses, and cannot recover if 
he blindly relies upon a misrepresentation the falsity of which would be patent to him if he had 
utilized his opportunity to make a cursory examination or investigation.”); see also Abu Dhabi 
Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(“Reasonable reliance entails a duty to investigate the legitimacy of an investment opportunity where 
the plaintiff was placed on guard or practically faced with the facts.” (quoting Crigger v. Fahnestock 
& Co., 443 F.3d 230, 234 (2d Cir. 2006))). 
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4. Any Morality-Based Justification Would Mandate Punitive Damages 
in Tort 
The promise principle recognizes a moral obligation to keep 
promises: 
An individual is morally bound to keep his promises because he has 
intentionally invoked a convention whose function it is to give 
grounds—moral grounds—for another to expect the promised 
performance.  To renege is to abuse a confidence he was free to invite 
or not, and which he intentionally did invite.181 
Commentators repeatedly reject the morality-based promise principle as 
the justification for benefit-of-the-bargain damages for breach of contract 
because it conflicts with encouraging efficient breaches of contract,182 
one of the same reasons why contract law does not impose punitive 
damages.183  If a party owes a moral duty to keep his promise, that party 
would not be free to breach if the breach is economically efficient.184  
Commentators also argue that if a moral obligation to maintain promises 
really exists, it requires more than expectation-based damages; instead, 
the moral obligation would require specific performance of the 
contract.185 
Even if moral grounds do not support the award of benefit-of-the-
bargain damages for breach of contract, the grounds may support such an 
award for fraudulent misrepresentation.  Unlike in breach of contract, the 
speaker of a fraudulent misrepresentation acts with an “intent to 
                                                     
 181. FRIED, supra note 137, at 16. 
 182. See Kraus, supra note 147, at 1606 (“To many, the efficient breach hypothesis suggests that 
expectation damages actually encourage and thereby endorse breach.  So understood, the objection 
to the expectation damages rule is not merely that it falls short of enforcing the promisor’s 
corresponding moral duty, but that it affirmatively undermines it.”); see also id. at 1604 n.3 (listing 
scholarly articles supporting the efficient breach principle). 
 183. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 184. See Shiffrin, supra note 174, at 722 (“[T]ypically, a promisor is morally expected to keep 
her promise through performance.”). 
 185. See id. at 722–23 (“Contract law, however, diverges from morality in this respect.  Contract 
law’s dominant remedy is not specific performance but expectation damages.”); see also DORI 
KIMEL, FROM PROMISE TO CONTRACT: TOWARDS A LIBERAL THEORY OF CONTRACT 95–96 (2003); 
Peter Benson, The Idea of a Public Basis of Justification for Contract, 33 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 273, 
291–93 (1995); T. M. Scanlon, Promises and Contracts, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: NEW 
ESSAYS 86, 92 (Peter Benson ed., 2001).  Fried may have advocated expectation damages instead of 
specific performance because of efficient breaches.  Gil Lahav, A Principle of Justified Promise-
Breaking and Its Application to Contract Law, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. LAW 163, 177–78 
(2000). 
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deceive.”186  The moral imperative to force the fraudulent party to make 
good on his representation seems even stronger for fraudulent 
misrepresentation than for breach of contract. 
In tort, though, the moral imperative that people should not lie would 
not justify an award of compensatory benefit-of-the-bargain damages.  
Compensatory damages are supposed to return the plaintiff to his 
position before the tort.187  Morality mandates relief not because of the 
plaintiff’s changed position or because the plaintiff has some expectation 
deriving from the promise.  This is evident in the fact that morality 
would require a promisor to keep his promise even if the promisee were 
dead.188 
Applied to fraudulent misrepresentation, morality would require the 
defendant to pay expectation-based damages because the defendant acted 
immorally when making the fraudulent misrepresentation.  In tort, these 
damages are punitive because they focus on the defendant’s conduct.189  
Even in the contract context the punitive nature of the morality theory is 
evident: “If one gives great weight to the morality of promise-keeping, 
[the moral obligation] would support enforcement of penalties.”190  Thus, 
if applicable to fraudulent misrepresentation, morality would mandate an 
award of punitive, and not compensatory, damages for the defendant’s 
egregious and intentional conduct.191 
Another reason that morality cannot justify benefit-of-the-bargain 
damages for fraudulent misrepresentation is that the vast majority of 
                                                     
 186. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 187. See supra Part II.B. 
 188. See FRIED, supra note 137, at 15 (discussing that any theory that would allow a promisor to 
not keep his promise just because the promisee is dead is not a moral theory). 
 189. See infra notes 222–23 and accompanying text. 
 190. Kenneth C. Kettering, True Sale of Receivables: A Purposive Analysis, 16 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 511, 548 (2008); see also Shiffrin, supra note 174, at 710, 726–27 (arguing that 
contract law diverges from morality in its failure to award punitive damages for intentional 
breaches). 
 191. The promise principle morality theory mandates expectation-based damages because if the 
promisor fails to fulfill his promise, it is fair that he should have to pay the equivalent of the 
promised performance.  FRIED, supra note 137, at 17.  The damages are based on the promisor’s 
actions, but the damages also coincide with the purpose of compensatory damages for breach of 
contract, which is to compensate the nonbreaching party by placing him in the same position as if the 
promisor had performed.  See supra Part II.A.  In tort, benefit-of-the-bargain damages do not 
coincide with the purpose of compensatory damages, which is to restore the injured party to the 
position he was in before the tort occurred.  See supra Part II.B.  Moreover, punitive damages—
available in tort but not for breach of contract—are the only type of tort damages capable of being 
based on the wrongdoer’s conduct.  See infra notes 222–23 and accompanying text.  Thus, even if 
the promise principle would support an award of compensatory damages for breach of contract, it 
would also support an award of punitive damages for fraudulent misrepresentation.  This is similar to 
how the same conduct can be the basis for both a breach-of-contract and tort action even though 
punitive damages are available only for the tort action.  See infra note 263 and accompanying text. 
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fraudulent misrepresentation cases do not involve promissory 
representations.  In the contract context, if a party fails to perform as he 
promised, “it is fair that [he] should be made to hand over the equivalent 
of the promised performance.”192  But the typical fraudulent 
misrepresentation concerns only the value of a good.193  Must the 
defendant still deliver the monetary equivalent of a good conforming to 
the misrepresentation?  Even though the misrepresentation was 
fraudulent, it does not seem fair to award compensatory damages 
encompassing delivery of a good if the misrepresentation did not include 
any promise to convey the same good. 
In fraudulent misrepresentation, the wrong occurs not when the 
nonconforming good is delivered but when the misrepresentation is 
made.194  The fraudulent misrepresentation itself is harmful because it 
creates a false belief.195  The immorality of the misrepresentation, 
however, does not create a compensable loss based on the later receipt of 
a good not conforming to the misrepresentation.  A compensable loss 
exists only if the plaintiff incurred some actual loss in reliance on the 
misrepresentation, mainly out-of-pocket losses based on any difference 
between the purchase price and fair market value of the good. 
VII.THE RESULTING PROBLEM IS MORE THAN MERE 
OVERCOMPENSATION 
Perhaps benefit-of-the-bargain damages are not compensatory and 
cannot be justified as compensatory damages by any contract law theory.  
But is it really problematic to base compensatory damages on the lost 
expected benefit of the bargain?  The obvious consequence is 
overcompensation, something that most plaintiffs would not mind. 
Overcompensation is not tolerated in other torts.  To the contrary, 
compensatory damages make the plaintiff whole and do no more.196  If 
the plaintiff incurs medical expenses, the amount of damages is based on 
the amount of those medical expenses.197  The factfinder lacks the ability 
                                                     
 192. FRIED, supra note 137, at 17. 
 193. See supra note 2. 
 194. See FRIED, supra note 137, at 9 (explaining that in a promise, “the wrong is done later, 
when the promise is not kept—while a lie is a wrong committed at the time of its utterance”). 
 195. Id. at 78 (“A simple lie does harm because it is believed . . . .”).  A fraudulent 
misrepresentation regarding the value of a good creates only a belief regarding the value of the good; 
it does not create a belief regarding receipt of the good or any profit to be obtained through 
purchasing the good.  See supra Part VI.A. 
 196. See supra Part II.B. 
 197. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 7, § 8.1(3), at 375–76. 
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to add additional compensatory damages onto the medical expenses 
simply because the factfinder is unhappy with the defendant’s conduct.198  
Similarly, the factfinder in a fraudulent misrepresentation claim should 
not be able to add additional compensatory damages simply because the 
defendant lied. 
There is also a consequence greater than overcompensation—
measuring tort-based compensatory damages by the benefit of the 
bargain has enabled a disconnect between the plaintiff’s loss and the 
amount of compensatory damages.  Apparently, the plaintiff’s loss no 
longer controls the amount of compensatory damages.  The disconnect is 
evident in an exception that Massachusetts courts have developed to the 
majority benefit-of-the-bargain damages rule.  Specifically, 
Massachusetts courts do not award benefit-of-the-bargain damages—the 
damages necessary to make the plaintiff whole—when the award is 
disproportionate to the defendant’s conduct because the defendant gained 
no profit or because the plaintiff lacks actual losses.199 
Suppose that the plaintiff agreed to purchase a good for $200 after 
the defendant represented that it was worth $500, but the delivered good 
was actually worth only $200.  Under the majority rule, the plaintiff 
needs $300 in damages to be made whole.200  But under the 
Massachusetts exception, no damages are necessary to compensate the 
plaintiff because the defendant made no profit.201  Also under the 
Massachusetts exception, if the plaintiff never acquired the good, no 
compensatory damages are necessary.202  In fact, under these 
circumstances, not only are compensatory damages unnecessary 
                                                     
 198. See id. 
 199. See Twin Fires Inv., LLC v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 837 N.E.2d 1121, 1135–
36 (Mass. 2005) (refusing to award benefit-of-the-bargain damages because the plaintiff had no 
actual losses and the defendant experienced no gain due to the alleged fraud).  Thus, Massachusetts 
courts will still award benefit-of-the-bargain damages if the defendant made a profit.  But see supra 
note 119 (explaining that the proper remedy to obtain the defendant’s profits is restitution). 
 200. See supra Part III.D–E.  Despite the plaintiff’s lack of out-of-pocket losses, the Second 
Restatement directs that damages are appropriate.  One of the Second Restatement’s examples of 
when benefit-of-the-bargain damages are appropriate is if the good received by the plaintiff is 
something that “because of the matter misrepresented, he does not want and cannot use.” 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549 cmts. g & j (1977).  If the fair market value of the good 
equals the purchase price, the plaintiff has no out-of-pocket losses but has a good that he did not 
want.  The Restatement claims that the only way to restore the plaintiff to his original position is to 
award benefit-of-the-bargain damages.  Id. § 549 cmt. i.  But this is not necessarily true.  The 
plaintiff is obviously free to resell the good.  See id. § 549 cmt. j.  Any damages based on the delay 
or other consequences of being forced to resell could be recovered by the plaintiff as consequential 
damages.  Reselling the good would be a hassle, but the buyer still needs to repurchase the good 
even after an award of benefit-of-the-bargain damages. 
 201. See Twin Fires Inv., LLC, 837 N.E.2d at 1136. 
 202. Id. 
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according to Massachusetts law, they are also inappropriate because they 
would confer a “windfall.”203 
The plaintiff’s situation no longer controls the amount of 
compensatory damages.  The plaintiff acts no differently regardless of 
whether the defendant makes a profit or ultimately delivers the good.  
The plaintiff may lack out-of-pocket losses but still has disappointed 
expectations that, under the majority rule, must be compensated or the 
plaintiff will not be made whole.  But, again, the plaintiff’s situation does 
not control.  Instead, the defendant’s conduct—not profiting from the 
transaction, not delivering the good, or both—controls the amount of 
damages necessary to make the plaintiff whole. 
The disconnect between the plaintiff’s loss and the amount of 
compensatory damages draws the focus away from compensating the 
plaintiff.  The amount of damages depends on factors that have nothing 
to do with the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s resulting losses—factors like 
the defendant’s conduct.  When courts first began awarding benefit-of-
the-bargain damages for fraudulent misrepresentation, dissenters 
criticized that the benefit-of-the-bargain measure “places cause before 
effect” by awarding damages based on the defendant’s conduct, the tort, 
instead of the plaintiff’s resulting injury.204  It seems that courts now 
continue to focus on the “cause” of the damages but use the cause to 
reduce the plaintiff’s damages. 
If we allow this disconnect to continue within fraudulent 
misrepresentation, what is to stop it from permeating into other torts?  
The plaintiff’s compensatory damages for personal injury apparently 
should differ depending on whether the defendant acted intentionally (in 
a battery claim) or negligently (in a negligence claim).  This distinction 
already exists in misrepresentation, where lesser damages are available 
for negligent misrepresentation because “the fault of the maker of the 
misrepresentation is sufficiently less.”205  And further, the plaintiff’s 
                                                     
 203. Id. (“Where the plaintiffs have not lost the benefit of a bargain because of a 
misrepresentation and a defendant has not gained anything thereby, awarding benefit of the bargain 
damages would be more than is required ‘reasonably [to] make the injured party whole’; it would 
create a ‘windfall.’” (quoting Kattar v. Demoulas, 739 N.E.2d 246, 258 (Mass. 2000))). 
 204. Hallen v. Martin, 167 N.W. 314, 323 (S.D. 1918) (Whiting & Gates, JJ., dissenting). 
 205. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. a (1979).  The difference in liability is due 
to the distinction between a duty of care and a duty of honesty.  Id.  The duty of honesty is implicit 
in every transaction, whereas the duty of care will exist only in certain circumstances.  Id.  Those 
certain circumstances include when the defendant has a pecuniary interest in the representation, 
which is presumed if the defendant gives the representation within his “business, profession, or 
employment.”  Id. § 549 cmt. d.  By limiting the recognition of a duty of care to those 
representations, “the law promotes the important social policy of encouraging the flow of 
commercial information upon which the operation of the economy rests.”  Id. § 549 cmt. a. 
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compensatory damages in negligence apparently should differ depending 
on whether the defendant was grossly negligent or merely negligent.206  
Even without the possibility of permeation, how can benefit-of-the-
bargain damages be compensatory if the damages are based on factors 
other than the plaintiff’s loss?  And if benefit-of-the-bargain damages are 
compensatory even though their availability depends on factors other 
than the plaintiff’s loss, what exactly does compensatory mean anymore? 
Tort law cannot tolerate any disconnect between the amount of 
compensatory damages and the plaintiff’s situation.  The main purpose 
of tort law is to compensate the plaintiff, and the only way that tort law 
accomplishes this purpose is through awarding compensatory 
damages.207  If compensatory damages are not based on the plaintiff’s 
loss, then compensatory damages may not make the plaintiff whole and 
tort law would not fulfill its main purpose.  To ensure that compensatory 
damages continue to make the plaintiff whole, the only factor relevant to 
the measure of compensatory damages for fraudulent misrepresentation 
must be the plaintiff’s actual, out-of-pocket losses. 
VIII.LIMITING THE RECOVERY OF BENEFIT-OF-THE-BARGAIN DAMAGES 
FOR FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION 
The purposes of tort law control both the type of available damages 
and the measures of those damages.208  Consistent with the purposes of 
tort law, compensatory damages for fraudulent misrepresentation must 
be limited to out-of-pocket losses.  The only purpose of tort law 
consistent with the awarding of benefit-of-the-bargain damages is to 
“punish wrongdoers and deter wrongful conduct.”209  It follows that if 
benefit-of-the-bargain damages are awarded for fraudulent 
misrepresentation, they can only be awarded as punitive damages. 
                                                     
 206. See id. § 549 cmt. i. 
 207. Likely the only reason that the disconnect between the plaintiff’s actual loss (supposedly 
measured by the lost benefit) and the amount of compensatory damages is tolerated is that benefit-
of-the-bargain damages are not really compensatory.  See supra Part V.  Surely, if a jury awarded 
compensatory damages based on the plaintiff’s medical expenses, a court would not get away with 
reducing that verdict—awarding the plaintiff her medical expenses for one leg but not the other—
because the defendant’s conduct was not especially reprehensible. 
 208. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 cmt. a (“Only those damages will be awarded 
that tend to carry out one or more of these purposes [of tort law].”). 
 209. Id. § 901(c). 
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A. Limit Compensatory Damages to Out-of-Pocket Losses 
Tort-based compensatory damages are limited to the amount 
necessary to put the injured plaintiff in the same position as if the 
fraudulent misrepresentation had not occurred.210  Awarding the plaintiff 
out-of-pocket losses and any consequential damages fulfills this first 
purpose of tort law.  Therefore, courts should limit recoverable 
compensatory damages for fraudulent misrepresentation to actual, out-of-
pocket losses. 
If the plaintiff lacks out-of-pocket losses or other consequential 
damages, the plaintiff has no claim because nominal damages are not 
available.211  “[T]here can be no recovery [for fraudulent 
misrepresentation] if the plaintiff is none the worse off for the 
misrepresentation, however flagrant it may have been . . . .”212 
B. Allow Recovery of Benefit-of-the-Bargain Damages Only as Punitive 
Damages 
Another purpose of tort law is to punish wrongdoers and deter 
wrongful conduct.213  Tort law accomplishes these purposes by awarding 
punitive damages.214  The purpose of benefit-of-the-bargain damages is 
to punish the fraudulent party—these damages should be awarded only 
as punitive damages.215 
                                                     
 210. See id. § 901 cmt. a. 
 211. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 68, § 110, at 765–66 (explaining that the modern claim for 
misrepresentation is “a descendant of the older action on the case” meaning “that the plaintiff must 
have suffered substantial damage before the cause of action can arise”); Derry v. Peek, [1889] 14 
A.C. 337 (H.L.) 343 (appeal taken from Eng.) (“[F]raud without damage or damage without fraud 
does not give rise to such actions.”).  If the plaintiff has no actual damages, the claim fails; the court 
cannot create damages when none exist by awarding benefit-of-the-bargain damages.  But see 
Murray v. Jennings, 42 Conn. 9, 9 (1875) (“In one sense the plaintiff would seem to have suffered no 
damage, but the law gives her the benefit of the contract . . . .”). 
 212. KEETON ET AL., supra note 68, § 110, at 765 (explaining that nominal damages are not 
recoverable for fraudulent misrepresentation). 
 213. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901(c). 
 214. See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text. 
 215. Some states do not allow an award of punitive damages unless the plaintiff recovers an 
award of underlying damages; some allow those underlying damages to be either nominal or 
compensatory, but some states require the underlying damages to be compensatory.  See 1 DOBBS, 
supra note 7, § 3.11(10), at 513–14.  Practically, benefit-of-the-bargain punitive damages may not be 
available if the plaintiff lacks out-of-pocket losses or consequential damages.  The underlying 
compensatory damage requirement makes no sense in a case like fraudulent misrepresentation, 
where out-of-pocket losses may not exist, but the wrong is clear.  The Supreme Court has implicitly 
recognized this by mentioning that a higher ratio between compensatory and punitive damages may 
be appropriate if compensatory damages are minimal; still though, this seems to imply that some 
compensatory damages are necessary for a punitive damage award to be constitutional.  See infra 
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1. The Purpose of Benefit-of-the-Bargain Damages Is to Punish 
An early rationale for the availability of benefit-of-the-bargain 
damages for fraudulent misrepresentation was that the defendant cannot 
be better off damages-wise if he commits fraud as opposed to breach of 
contract.  “[A] fraud accompanied by a broken promise should cost the 
wrongdoer as much as the breach of promise alone.”216  As explained by 
McCormick: 
[I]f the defendant by willful falsehood has cozened the plaintiff into 
risking his property upon a bargain, which, upon the information given 
by the defendant, would have been profitable, a remedy which merely 
seeks to place the plaintiff back in the position he was in before seems 
hardly adequate.  The plaintiff might as well be given the value of the 
expected bargain.217 
The Second Restatement of Torts adopted this sentiment when 
concluding that out-of-pocket losses may not provide “just” 
compensation because, if the plaintiff does not have any out-of-pocket 
losses, the defendant could get away with fraud without civil 
punishment.218 
There is nothing wrong with the desire to punish the wrongdoer by 
making him pay as much in damages for fraud as he would have to pay 
for breach of contract.219  The way to punish the wrongdoer, however, is 
not to pretend that benefit-of-the-bargain damages are compensatory.220 
                                                                                                                       
notes 245–48 and accompanying text.  Regardless, the solution to the problem—the lack of other 
underlying damages—is not to invent additional compensatory damages based on the lost 
expectation.  Instead, courts should not require underlying compensatory damages or award nominal 
damages for fraudulent misrepresentation. 
 216. KEETON ET AL., supra note 68, § 110, at 769.  It is also not clear why it is important for the 
amount of compensatory damages for contract and fraud to match.  Assuming the plaintiff can bring 
and succeed on both claims, the damage awards will merge.  See, e.g., Trimble v. Pracna, 167 
S.W.3d 706, 711 (Mo. 2005) (explaining that when the plaintiff sought benefit-of-the-bargain 
damages for both fraud and contract claims, the damage awards merged because “[a] plaintiff is only 
entitled to be made whole once . . . and the election of theories doctrines are intended to prevent a 
plaintiff from recovering more than one full recovery for the same harm”). 
 217. MCCORMICK, supra note 128, § 121, at 453 (emphasis added). 
 218. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text. 
 219. In tort, nominal damages are the proper remedy to vindicate legal rights despite the lack of 
actual damages.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 cmt. b (1979).  Nominal damages, 
however, are not available for misrepresentation.  KEETON ET AL., supra note 68, § 110, at 765–66. 
 220. Hallen v. Martin, 167 N.W. 314, 322 (S.D. 1918) (Whiting & Gates, JJ., dissenting) 
(explaining the concern that limiting damages to out-of-pocket losses for fraudulent 
misrepresentation might encourage or reward the wrongdoer and “might be good ground for holding 
that, in a proper case, punitive damages should be allowed”).  For a discussion that benefit-of-the-
bargain damages cannot be compensatory as defined by tort law, see supra Part V.A. 
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When awarded for fraudulent misrepresentation, benefit-of-the-
bargain damages are classic punitive damages.  The point of benefit-of-
the-bargain damages is to punish the wrongdoer, and, in tort law, 
damages designed to punish or deter are punitive.221  Further, the current 
availability of benefit-of-the-bargain damages for misrepresentation 
depends not on the plaintiff’s injury but on the defendant’s culpability.222  
Damages based “on behavior and characteristics of the defendant rather 
than the plaintiff” are punitive.223 
Refreshingly, some courts are not afraid to admit this punitive 
purpose, commenting specifically that the “benefit-of-the-bargain rule is 
a punitive measure which ‘compels [a] party guilty of fraud to make 
good his or her representations.’”224  Even when courts cannot admit that 
benefit-of-the-bargain damages are punitive, they are still hesitant to 
award them when it would be unjust to punish the defendant.225  Courts 
recognize the punitive nature of benefit-of-the-bargain damages; they 
should, therefore, award benefit-of-the-bargain damages as punitive 
damages for fraudulent misrepresentation. 
2. The Plaintiff’s Additional Burden to Demonstrate Entitlement to 
Punitive Damages 
Unlike compensatory damages, punitive damages are not 
automatically recoverable in tort, and their availability depends on state 
law.  Some states do not allow recovery of punitive damages at all.226  
Some states have statutorily defined the availability of punitive 
                                                     
 221. See supra Part II.B. 
 222. See supra Part III.E–F (explaining that benefit-of-the-bargain damages are available when 
the defendant acts with an intent to deceive in making the misrepresentation but not if the defendant 
was negligent as to the representation’s falsity). 
 223. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS 520 (11th ed. 
2005). 
 224. Goodrich & Pennington Mortg. Fund, Inc. v. J.R. Woolard, Inc., 101 P.3d 792, 796 (Nev. 
2004) (citing Lightning Litho, Inc. v. Danka Indus., 776 N.E.2d 1238, 1242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)). 
 225. See, e.g., Twin Fires Inv., LLC v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 837 N.E.2d 1121, 
1134–36 (Mass. 2005) (affirming lower court’s decision to deny benefit-of-the-bargain damages of 
$13 million and instead award approximately $40,000 in reliance damages because the plaintiff had 
no actual losses and the defendant experienced no gain due to the alleged fraud); see also Barry 
Ravech, Conditions Precedent, Benefit of the Bargain Damages in Fraud and Proportionate 
Counsel Fees in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 11 Proceedings, 90 MASS. L. REV. 28, 32 (2006) 
(discussing the Twin Fires court’s refusal to award benefit-of-the-bargain damages because it “did 
not see fit to further punish the defendants by applying the more generous benefit of the bargain 
damage rule”). 
 226. See MCCORMICK, supra note 128, § 78, at 279 (discussing that Louisiana, Massachusetts, 
Nebraska, and Washington do not allow recovery of punitive damages, except if allowed by specific 
statute). 
LENS FINAL 12/1/2010  5:47:02 PM 
2011] HONEST CONFUSION 275 
damages.227  Other states use a more general common law standard, 
allowing punitive damages if the defendant’s conduct “is outrageous, 
because of the defendant’s evil motive or his reckless indifference to the 
rights of others.”228 
In some jurisdictions, the finding that the defendant committed fraud 
alone is likely sufficient to give the jury the option to award punitive 
damages.229  “An intent to deceive is roughly equivalent to the 
requirement of an evil mind for punitive damages purposes.”230  Thus, 
“actual fraud is often, though not always, sufficient to support the 
recovery of punitive damages.”231  Some states even define by statute 
that punitive damages are appropriate if the plaintiff proves that the 
defendant committed “fraud,” meaning the defendant made an 
“intentional misrepresentation . . . with the intention of causing injury to 
the plaintiff.”232 
                                                     
 227. These states include, but are not limited to, Alabama, California, Kentucky, and Nevada.  
See ALA. CODE § 6-11-20 (2005); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1997); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.  
§ 411.186 (West 2006); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42.005 (West 2000). 
 228. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979); see also 1 DOBBS, supra note 7,  
§ 3.11(2), at 468 (discussing that courts allow the recovery of punitive damages “if [the defendant] is 
malicious . . . reckless . . . oppressive, evil, wicked, guilty of wanton or morally culpable conduct, or 
shows flagrant indifference to the safety of others”). 
 229. See MCCORMICK, supra note 128, § 121, at 453–54 (discussing that a “willful fraud,” if 
proven, is likely sufficient to demonstrate entitlement to punitive damages). 
 230. Rowe v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., No. CV-07-1281-PHX-MHM, 2008 WL 5156077, at 
*9 (D. Ariz. Dec. 9, 2008). 
 231. Id. (citing Farr v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 376, 383 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984)); see 
also Whitworth v. Fid. Mortg. Co., No. C 05-04725 MHP, 2009 WL 1246687, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 
5, 2009) (awarding punitive damages for fraudulent misrepresentation where the plaintiff established 
by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant “never intended to make good on his promises 
to the plaintiff”); Palmer v. Web Indus., No. CV 04-2362-PCT-SMM, 2007 WL 45927, at *8 (D. 
Ariz. Jan. 8, 2007) (awarding punitive damages for fraudulent misrepresentation because “[f]raud 
and misrepresentation are not acceptable business practices, and the conscious evil of such behavior 
is obvious”); Applied Capital, Inc. v. Gibson, No. Civ 05-98 JB/ACT, 2007 WL 5685131, at *14 
(D.N.M. Sept. 27, 2007) (“Punitive damages are an appropriate sanction for fraudulent 
misrepresentation.”); Deep Marine Tech., Inc. v. Conmaco/Rector, L.P., 515 F. Supp. 2d 760, 
772 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (“Texas law protects this interest by authorizing exemplary damages for 
fraudulent misrepresentation, including punitive damages that are designed ‘to punish a party for its 
outrageous, malicious, or otherwise morally culpable conduct and to deter it and others from 
committing the same or similar acts in the future.’” (quoting Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. 
Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 40 (Tex. 1998))); In re Estate of Stockdale, Nos. Mon-P-234-03 & Mon-P-
211-00, 2006 WL 3770841, at *14 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 26, 2006) (“Fraudulent 
misrepresentations are a sufficient basis for punitive damages.”); Smith v. Reinhart Ford, 68 Pa. D. 
& C.4th 432, 440 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2004) (acknowledging that “fraud and misrepresentation claims 
support punitive damages”). 
 232. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.184.  Alabama’s, California’s, and Nevada’s punitive damage 
statutes contain similar language.  See ALA. CODE § 6-11-20; CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294; NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 42.001. 
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Not all states are so quick to award punitive damages for fraudulent 
misrepresentation.  “Fraudulent, intentional, malicious, or reckless 
conduct which warrants an award of compensatory damages does not 
necessarily qualify for an award of punitive damages.”233  Simply 
because the defendant intended to deceive does not mean his conduct is 
so egregious that it justifies an award of punitive damages.234  State 
courts adopting this sentiment hold that punitive damages should be 
awarded in only the most egregious cases.235  And even in those states 
that allow the recovery of punitive damages based on fraud alone, the 
plaintiff likely has to prove fraud by clear and convincing evidence.236 
Awarding benefit-of-the-bargain damages only as punitive damages 
will make it more difficult for the plaintiff to recover them.  But even as 
compensatory damages, benefit-of-the-bargain damages are not always 
available for fraudulent misrepresentation.  As already discussed, 
Massachusetts law limits the recovery of benefit-of-the-bargain damages 
“to cases of intentional misrepresentation where . . . [the plaintiff] has 
actually acquired something in a transaction that is of less value than he 
was led to believe it was worth when he bargained for it.”237 
Moreover, it is appropriate that benefit-of-the-bargain damages 
should not always be available for fraudulent misrepresentation.  It is 
clear that benefit-of-the-bargain damages are something more than 
compensatory; the damages make the plaintiff better off than before the 
tort.238  A plaintiff thus should have an additional burden to demonstrate 
                                                     
 233. Jarmakowicz v. Suddarth, No. M1998-00920-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 196982, at *13 
(Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2001). 
 234. See, e.g., Orlando v. Novurania of Am., Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 220, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(finding that the “defendant’s misrepresentation about the hull not being repaired is neither evil nor 
reprehensible as that term is understood in the context of punitive damage awards”); Greenell Corp. 
v. Penobscot Air Serv., Ltd., No. 99-31-P-C, 1999 WL 33117116, at *10 (D. Me. Aug. 19, 1999) 
(noting that evidence of misrepresentations and that the defendant led the plaintiff along are 
“insufficient for the necessary level of outrageous conduct”); Reed Cadillac-Olds, Inc. v. Habhab, 
No. 98-0916, 2000 WL 1157819, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2000) (“Punitive damages are 
generally not allowed in fraudulent misrepresentation or breach of contract cases absen[t] a showing 
of malice, fraud, or other illegal acts.”). 
 235. Jarmakowicz, 2001 WL 196982, at *13 (concluding that if punitive damages are awarded in 
cases where the defendant’s conduct was less than “the most egregious,” punitive damages would 
lose their deterrent effect); see also Johnson v. Black Bros., 879 So. 2d 525, 529 (Miss. Ct. App. 
2004) (“[P]unitive damages are appropriate only in extreme cases and should be allowed ‘only with 
caution and within narrow limits.’” (quoting Beta Beta Chapter of Beta Theta Pi Fraternity v. May, 
611 So. 2d 889, 894 (Miss. 1992))). 
 236. 1 DOBBS, supra note 7, § 3.11(4), at 484–85 (explaining that many jurisdictions have 
rejected the “preponderance of the evidence” standard and are increasingly requiring a “clear and 
convincing evidence” standard or higher). 
 237. Twin Fires Inv., Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 837 N.E.2d 1121, 1135 (Mass. 
2005). 
 238. See supra Part V.A. 
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entitlement to this financial windfall.  If benefit-of-the-bargain damages 
are awarded only as punitive damages, that appropriate, additional 
burden would require the plaintiff to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that the defendant’s conduct was so outrageous as to justify an 
award of punitive damages. 
3. Awarding the Plaintiff Lost Expectations Increases Predictability in 
Punitive Damage Awards 
“Whether to award punitive damages and the determination of the 
amount are within the sound discretion of the trier of fact . . . .”239  In 
making this determination, the factfinder looks to the defendant’s act, the 
defendant’s motive, the extent of harm to the injured person, the burden 
put on the plaintiff due to the injury, the defendant’s wealth, and whether 
others have been affected by or brought similar claims against the 
defendant based on his conduct at issue.240  Using these general factors, 
factfinders award punitive damages more frequently and in higher 
amounts in the United States than anywhere else in the world.241 
According to the United States Supreme Court, the problem is not 
that punitive damage awards are frequent and high but that the amounts 
of the awards are “stark[ly] unpredictab[le].”242  Also according to the 
Supreme Court, this unpredictability will remain as long as courts 
continue to use general jury instructions: “Instructions can go just so far 
in promoting systemic consistency when awards are not tied to 
specifically proven items of damage . . . .”243 
Tying the amount of punitive damages to the plaintiff’s expectation 
would provide some consistency in punitive damage awards for 
fraudulent misrepresentation.  The court could instruct the jury to 
consider the general factors relevant to the amount of punitive damages 
and also to consider specifically the defendant’s misrepresentation of the 
value and the value of the good with which the plaintiff is left.  Even 
without an aim to improve consistency, “[b]etter guidance in instructions 
                                                     
 239. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. d (1979). 
 240. Id. § 908 cmt. e.  The Supreme Court recently clarified that when a jury is determining an 
amount of punitive damages, it cannot increase the damages to punish the defendant for its conduct 
towards others besides the plaintiff.  Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 354 (2007).  The 
jury may, however, consider the defendant’s conduct towards others when determining the 
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct toward the plaintiff and use that reprehensibility to 
determine the amount of punitive damages.  Id. at 355. 
 241. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2623 (2008). 
 242. Id. at 2625. 
 243. Id. at 2628. 
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is a good idea.”244  Jury instructions specifically indicating that the jury 
should consider the plaintiff’s lost benefit would provide the jury with a 
connection between the defendant’s conduct and the amount of punitive 
damages. 
Unfortunately, increasing the predictability in the amounts of 
punitive damages for fraudulent misrepresentation may not necessarily 
mean that the awards would be constitutional.  Allegedly excessive 
punitive damage awards have been the subject of multiple due process 
constitutional challenges.245  Most of these challenges occurred when the 
punitive award greatly exceeded the compensatory award.  This is also 
likely to occur in fraudulent misrepresentation claims if benefit-of-the-
bargain-based compensatory damages are not awarded because out-of-
pocket losses are often minimal.  At the same time, an award of punitive 
damages may be high because the defendant clearly committed a wrong. 
So far, the Supreme Court has refused to define a constitutionally 
acceptable ratio between the amounts of punitive and actual damages 
awarded.246  But the Court has suggested that a higher ratio may be 
appropriate if the actual injury is minimal but the wrong is clear.247  
Thus, even if the benefit-of-the-bargain-based punitive damage award 
                                                     
 244. 1 DOBBS, supra note 7, § 3.11(11), at 520. 
 245. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 560 (1996) (involving $4000 in 
compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive damages); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 409 (2003) (involving $1 million in compensatory damages and $145 
million in punitive damages); Williams, 549 U.S. at 350 (involving $821,000 in compensatory 
damages and $79.5 million in punitive damages). 
 246. The Supreme Court offered the following explanation for its resistance to defining set ratios 
for the relationship between compensatory and punitive damages: 
[W]e have been reluctant to identify concrete constitutional limits on the ratio between 
harm, or potential harm, to the plaintiff and the punitive damages award.  We decline 
again to impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive damages award cannot exceed.  Our 
jurisprudence and the principles it has now established demonstrate, however, that, in 
practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory 
damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process. . . . While these ratios are not 
binding, they are instructive.  They demonstrate what should be obvious: Single-digit 
multipliers are more likely to comport with due process, while still achieving the State’s 
goals of deterrence and retribution, than awards with ratios in range of 500 to 1, or, in this 
case, of 145 to 1. 
  Nonetheless, because there are no rigid benchmarks that a punitive damages award 
may not surpass, ratios greater than those we have previously upheld may comport with 
due process where “a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of 
economic damages.”  The converse is also true, however.  When compensatory damages 
are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can 
reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee. 
Campbell, 538 U.S. at 424–25 (internal citations omitted). 
 247. Gore, 517 U.S. at 582 (“Indeed, low awards of compensatory damages may properly 
support a higher ratio than high compensatory awards, if, for example, a particularly egregious act 
has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages.”). 
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greatly exceeds the amount of compensatory losses, this higher ratio may 
not be constitutionally offensive.  Also, a benefit-of-the-bargain-based 
punitive damage award should cause less constitutional problems 
because it is specifically related to the facts of the case.248 
C. Awarding Benefit-of-the-Bargain Damages as Punitive Damages 
Will Reaffirm the Distinction Between Contract and Tort 
Compensatory Damages 
If benefit-of-the-bargain damages are available only as punitive 
damages for fraudulent misrepresentation, courts will be better able to 
distinguish between contract and tort actions.  In most cases, the 
available compensatory damages will no longer be identical for breach of 
contract and fraudulent misrepresentation.  Similarly, tort compensatory 
damages will appropriately mirror breach-of-contract, reliance-based 
compensatory damages. 
1. Classifying Benefit-of-the-Bargain Damages as Punitive in Tort 
Enables Courts to Distinguish Between Contract and Tort Actions 
Based on the Damages Sought 
The current most popular effort to distinguish contract and tort 
actions is the economic-loss doctrine.249  The doctrine’s prohibition of 
the recovery of economic losses in tort, however, goes too far.  If courts 
do not develop exceptions, fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation 
claims will not survive.250  Also, the economic-loss doctrine is 
inconsistent with tort law’s traditional governance of damages the 
plaintiff incurs in reliance on a representation.251 
A better analysis for courts to use to distinguish between contract 
and tort is to focus on the nature and cause of the damages sought.  If the 
plaintiff seeks benefit-of-the-bargain damages, the plaintiff’s claim is for 
breach of contract.  Traditionally, only contract law compensates the 
plaintiff for disappointed expectations.252  More importantly, the breach 
of the contract is the cause of those disappointed expectations and 
                                                     
 248. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425 (noting that the appropriateness of a punitive damage 
amount depends on the “facts and circumstances of the defendant’s conduct and the harm to the 
plaintiff”). 
 249. See supra notes 93–98 and accompanying text. 
 250. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
 251. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 252. See supra Part II.A.1. 
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damages based on that disappointment should be recoverable as 
compensatory damages in contract law.253 
If the plaintiff seeks out-of-pocket losses or consequential damages 
incurred in reliance on the representation, the plaintiff’s claim is for 
misrepresentation, a tort.  These are traditional tort damages and should 
continue to be governed by tort law.  If the defendant’s conduct is 
egregious, the plaintiff can also seek punitive damages, another 
traditional tort remedy. 
Differentiating contract and tort actions based on the claimed 
damages has advantages over the economic-loss doctrine.  Similar to the 
economic-loss doctrine, this analysis requires a plaintiff to seek relief for 
breach of contract to recover damages based on expected economic 
gains—benefit-of-the-bargain damages.  At the same time, this analysis 
still allows recovery of compensatory damages, including economic 
losses incurred due to the plaintiff’s reliance on a misrepresentation in 
tort. 
2. Compensatory Damages in Tort Should Mirror Reliance-Based 
Compensatory Damages in Contract 
Although breach-of-contract and tort actions are different causes of 
action, there are some similarities between the types of compensatory 
damages available for both.  Limiting compensatory damages for 
fraudulent misrepresentation ensures proper consistency between tort 
damages and reliance-based compensatory damages for breach of 
contract. 
Scholars and courts agree that “tort damages are analogous to 
reliance damages, which are awarded in contract when there is particular 
difficulty in measuring the expectation interest.”254  This is because “tort 
damages generally compensate the plaintiff for loss and return him to the 
position he occupied before the injury.”255  Similarly, reliance-based 
compensatory damages in contract seek to put the plaintiff in the position 
as if the parties never entered into the contract.256  The aim of both types 
of compensatory damages is to return the plaintiff to the status quo, 
before the tort occurred or the contract was made.  Tort compensatory  
 
                                                     
 253. See supra Part VI.A. 
 254. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 873 n.9 (1986). 
 255. Id. 
 256. See supra Part II.A.2. 
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damages for misrepresentation thus should mirror reliance-based 
compensatory damages for breach of contract. 
The only tort-based damage similar to expectation-based 
compensatory damages for breach of contract is punitive damages.  What 
these types of damages have in common is the financial windfall that 
both provide to the plaintiff.  In contract, expectation-based 
compensatory damages require the breaching party to perform as the 
parties originally contemplated, thus giving the nonbreaching plaintiff 
something he lacked before the lawsuit.257  The only tort-based damages 
capable of providing the plaintiff with a windfall are punitive 
damages.258  By definition, tort-based compensatory damages do not 
provide the plaintiff with a financial windfall.259  Tort law tolerates a 
windfall to the plaintiff as a “means of securing public good through a 
kind of quasi-criminal punishment in the civil suit.”260  Thus, even 
though they are both labeled “compensatory,” benefit-of-the-bargain-
based compensatory damages for breach of contract are actually more 
similar to punitive damages in tort than they are to compensatory 
damages in tort. 
3. The Availability of Benefit-of-the-Bargain Damages in Contract 
Does Not Preclude Their Limited Availability in Tort 
Some courts may balk at the idea of classifying benefit-of-the-
bargain damages as punitive because these same damages are available 
for breach of contract whereas punitive damages generally are not.261  
The fact that benefit-of-the-bargain damages are regarded as 
compensatory in contract does not preclude courts from treating the same 
damages as punitive in tort.  To the contrary, this differential treatment is 
                                                     
 257. See supra note 158 and accompanying text (explaining that expectation-based 
compensatory damages are strange even in contract because the damages appear to do more than 
compensate). 
 258. See supra Part II.B. 
 259. See supra Part II.B. 
 260. 1 DOBBS, supra note 7, § 3.11(1), at 457; see also MCCORMICK, supra note 128, § 84, at 
296 (explaining that “the recovery of punitive damages is a windfall and not a right”). 
 261. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981) (“Punitive damages are not 
recoverable for a breach of contract unless the conduct constituting the breach is also a tort for which 
punitive damages are recoverable.”).  Punitive damages are prohibited partially because contract law 
recognizes the idea of an efficient breach—when a breaching party chooses to breach because the 
breach would be more economically efficient than performance.  See Shmuel I. Becher, A “Fair 
Contracts” Approval Mechanism: Reconciling Consumer Contracts and Conventional Contract 
Law, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 747, 779 (2009) (explaining that the award of punitive damages 
would undermine the basic principle of efficient breach because “performance will occur even where 
breach would be more efficient, ex post, punitive damages result in inefficient performances”). 
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proper based on the differing purposes of compensatory damages in 
contract and tort.262  Moreover, the fact that the defendant may have also 
committed a breach of contract does not preclude an award of punitive 
damages if he also commits an intentional tort.263  Thus, treating benefit-
of-the-bargain damages as punitive in tort law is actually consistent with 
the award of benefit-of-the-bargain damages in contract law. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Compensatory damages in tort are only supposed to be those 
damages necessary to return the plaintiff to the same position he would 
have been in had the tort not occurred.  The majority of jurisdictions hold 
that a plaintiff needs compensation for a lost expectation—benefit-of-
the-bargain damages—to be made whole after relying on a fraudulent 
misrepresentation.  Of course, those same jurisdictions may award less in 
damages and make the plaintiff less than whole if the defendant did not 
profit from the fraudulent misrepresentation or if the plaintiff did not 
receive a good from the defendant.  Apparently, it’s okay to make the 
plaintiff less than whole in these factual variations even though the 
plaintiff still lost an expectation.  Similarly, the majority of 
jurisdictions—the same jurisdictions that believe a plaintiff needs 
benefit-of-the-bargain damages to be made whole after a fraudulent 
misrepresentation—hold that benefit-of-the-bargain damages are not 
necessary to compensate a plaintiff for a lost expectation if the defendant 
merely acted negligently.  Again, apparently it’s okay to award less in 
damages despite the exact same injury because the defendant was merely 
negligent. 
Applying the fraudulent misrepresentation conception of 
compensatory to other torts, the amount of damages available to a 
plaintiff for injuries sustained in a car accident would depend on whether 
the defendant acted intentionally or negligently.  It would be permissible 
to give the plaintiff damages for medical expenses related to one leg, but 
not the other, if the defendant acted intentionally but his conduct was still 
not especially reprehensible.  Or it would be okay to not compensate the 
plaintiff for damages related to a preexisting medical condition if the 
defendant was merely negligent instead of grossly negligent. 
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 263. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. b (1979) (“When, however, the plaintiff has 
a right in the alternative to sue for a breach of contract or for a tort, the fact that his act or omission 
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The main purpose of tort law is to compensate injured parties, and 
tort law does so through compensatory damages.  But if factors other 
than the plaintiff’s situation control the amount of compensatory 
damages—factors like the defendant’s intent—tort law no longer 
accomplishes its main purpose.  Tort law cannot tolerate this possibility, 
either generally or within misrepresentation law. 
It is time to stop pretending that benefit-of-the-bargain damages are 
compensatory damages in tort.  Clearly, the damages put the plaintiff in a 
better position than before the tort by providing a financial windfall.  
Moreover, if the damages were truly compensatory, they would also be 
available for negligent misrepresentation.  Even if benefit-of-the-bargain 
damages are compensatory in contract law, they are not compensatory in 
tort.  Unlike a contract, a misrepresentation does not create an 
expectation; even if it did, expectations do not control the existence of 
tort duties and similarly should not control the amount of tort damages.  
Also, the various practical and theoretical justifications for awarding 
benefit-of-the-bargain damages in contract law—the expectation’s 
present value, the promotion of efficient breaches and commercial 
activity, and the morality-based promise principle—do not apply to tort 
law. 
The proper compensatory damages for fraudulent misrepresentation 
are the plaintiff’s out-of-pocket losses.  As for benefit-of-the-bargain 
damages, these damages still seem appropriate for fraudulent 
misrepresentation because the defendant may deserve to be punished.  
The desire to punish a defendant who commits fraud is not wrong—it is 
fraud, after all.  But jurisdictions need not rewrite the meaning of 
compensatory in tort law to make the defendant pay for his wrongful act; 
tort law already awards punitive damages to punish and deter the 
defendant.  Awarding benefit-of-the-bargain damages only as punitive 
damages ensures that courts award such damages only when the 
defendant deserves punishment and ensures that the punishment relates 
to the misrepresentation.  More importantly, awarding benefit-of-the-
bargain damages as punitive damages restores the meaning of 
compensatory in tort law by reconnecting the plaintiff’s injury with the 
amount of compensatory damages. 
 
